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The Brevity Book on 

PSYCHOLOGY 

By 

CHRISTIAN A. RUCKMICK 

Associate Professor of Psychology, 

University of Illinois. 

EDITORIAL BOARD: 

Wai^tkr DiIvIv Scott, President, The 
Scott Company, Engineers in Indus- 
trial Personnel; formerly President, 
The American Psychological Asso- 
ciation. 

W. V. Bingham, Dean, Division of 
Applied Psychology, Carnegie In- 
stitute of Technology; Chairman, 
Division of Anthropology and Psy- 
chology, National Research Council, 
Washington, D. C. 

R. S. White, Credit Manager, Amer- 
ican Steel & Wire Company; form- 
erly President, Chicago Association 
of Credit Men. 

Sam J. TuRNEs, General Sales Manager, 
Tire Division, The Brunsv^rick-Balke 
Collender Co., Chicago. 



BREVITY PUBLISHERS Inc. 

Chemical Building 

CHICAGO 

1920 



^'S' 



PREFACE 

This book attempts to present in a small compass 
the essential principles of psychology. The author 
hopes, however, that this brief text will invite the 
reader to follow a more extensive course of study in 
the subject. The book is further designed to give 
those who have either no access to the larger works 
or little time to devote to them, an adequate review 
of the science as currently interpreted by represent- 
ative psychologists. 

Christian A. Ruckmick 



University of Illinois 
Urbana, lUinois 
October 20, 1919 



JUL -6 1920 



©CLA570553 



CONTENTS 

CHAPTER PAGE 

I Introduction 1 

II Sensory Experience 12 

III Perceptual Experience 29 

IV Imaginal Experience 42 

V Aflfective Experience 50 

VI Mental Arrangement: Attention 57 

VII Mental Arrangement: Association 66 

VIII Action ::. 79 

IX Thought 88 

X The Self 95 

Appendix A — The Industrial Applications of 

Psychology 104 

Appendix B — Classified References 107 



2 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOI.OGY 

feature is added: psychology is supposed to be a 
mysterious art which operates best in the dark ! It is 
something mystical, supernatural, and has to do with 
the world of spirits and with the soul. No ghost in 
a dark closet ever held firmer sway over the child 
mind than does this type of "psychology" over public 
opinion; and no ghost could be more easily dispelled. 
A visit to a well equipped psychological laboratory 
in any of our larger universities would do much to 
convince the skeptic or to disillusion the misinformed. 
But since to most persons such a tour is impossible or 
inconvenient, following are, briefly, the essential facts 
concerning the nature of psychology in its modern 
aspects and the problems which it attempts to solve. 
2. De:i^iniTion. — Psychology is the science of 
mental phenomena. It begins by emphasizing the 
scientific nature of the study of mind. This text is 
being written in a psychological laboratory comprising 
some twenty or more rooms full of apparatus designed 
especially for the study of mind. There are scores of 
such laboratories in this country and in Europe, each 
one of them stocked with apparatus valued at $20,000 
or more. Some years ago the writer made a study of 
these laboratories and visited more than twenty in 
this country, in England, and in Germany. This de- 
velopment, however, is simply an indicator: hundreds 
of laboratories and thousands of dollars' worth of ap- 
paratus do not make a science. Many valuable facts 
in the sciences were discovered with very little appar- 
atus, or in some instances by means of crudely devised 
instruments. Psychologists were called into the army 
with other scientists; they frequently worked without 
the aid of equipment ; but they took with them the in- 
dispensible tool of all sciences: the scientific method. 



INTRODUCTION 3 

It was this method that was responsible for the widely- 
known tests whose aim it was to make our army 
mentally as well as physically fit. 

But before discussing methods let us return to the 
definition: the science of mental phenomena. What 
are mental phenomena? What is mind? It is as 
difficult to answer these questions without going into 
circular arguments as it is to define matter. Mind is 
that phase of the living organism which is aware or 
conscious. It consists of experience and accumulated 
experiences. Its phenomena are sensations, feelings, 
imagery, memories, thoughts, emotions, actions, and 
the like. The inscription on the ancient Greek temple 
at Delphi, ''Know Thyself' was incompletely answered 
until mind as well as body was examined. Aristotle, 
one of the most careful thinkers the Greeks produced, 
saw at once that his description of the world would 
not be complete unless he included treatises on mind, 
and he set to work to write what is probably the first 
text-book on psychology. Time and time again the 
question concerning the nature of the mind arose in 
the history of thought and many a philosopher has 
undertaken to find a suitable answer; hence the fre- 
quent confusion of psychology with philosophy and 
the long and late affiliation of the two subjects. Theo- 
logians, too, have tried their hand at the task because 
the mind seemed at first, and indeed for a long tim.e, 
something like the soul or spirit. The word ''psycho- 
logy'' literally means the study of the "psyche," or 
soul; hence the connection with spiritualism. Very 
few text-books, however, today mention the soul : the 
number is so small as to be practically negligible. The 
main difficulty with the term "soul" is its unscientific 
usage and meaning. What we today mean by the 



4 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

"sour' cannot be investigated in the laboratory; the 
discussion of this subject is left to theologians and 
philosophers. 

A useful distinction is commonly made between 
mind and consciousness. Mind is considered as the 
complete organisation of experiences in any one in- 
dividual, living organism; while consciousness is a hit 
of the organization, a momentary phase of it. In one 
connection we say, '*that person has a wonderful 
mind''; in the other, ''I have the consciousness of be- 
ing alone." We are conscious or aware of this or 
that; our consciousness changes from moment to 
moment, but our mind goes on until death. Our mind 
is the stream; our consciousnesses are the eddies in 
it. Another way of putting it is, mind is the entire 
system of processes ; consciousness is its chief charact- 
eristic: to be mindful is to be conscious. 

The reader may be aware of the inadequacy of the 
foregoing definitions ; but all definitions of fundamen- 
tal considerations are inadequate. If these preliminary 
statements were entirely adequate, there would be as 
little purpose for the writer to continue writing as it 
would be for the reader to proceed with his reading 
of the text. All that can reasonably be promised with 
continued writing and reading is an increased under- 
standing of the terms used. When the last page is 
turned, psychology, mind, consciousness, and many 
other terms will presumably be clearer than they are 
at this point. One of the best known manufacturers 
of phonographs and records advertises in a recent 
catalog, ''A .... record never sounds the same no 
matter how often you play it. The record doesn't 
change, but you do." So, as the terms occur over and 



INTRODUCTION 5 

over again, they will not change as they stand on the 
printed page, but you will. 

3. Me:thods. — The same difficulty that has present- 
ed itself in connection with other terms appears again 
when we discuss the chief method of psychology: 
introspection. Novelists and others write of it as if 
it were a sort of morbid, self-centered reflection. A 
famous physician has this meaning in mind when he 
writes in diagnosing a case of palpitation of the heart, 
"It may be due to indigestion, constipation, or intro- 
spection." To the psychologist and to those trained 
under his instruction it means nothing m^ore than a 
very careful analysis and report of their mental phen- 
omena. This may be easy or difficult, but there is 
nothing morbid about it, nor is the person who does 
it self-centered. He is least of all interested in him- 
self : he is objectively concerned with mental happen- 
ings, but his own individuality, if he is a true scientist, 
is never taken personally into account. Introspection 
becomes easy when Ihe problem is simplified : when 
I gaze on the red disc of the setting sun and turn to 
find that the red disc has given place to green after- 
images wherever I look — that is an easy piece of intro- 
spection. It is easy when the observer has been trained 
to introspect by habit and second nature; just as the 
botanist so educated easily sees a dozen species of 
ferns where the common tourist sees but one or two, 
or none at all. Introspections have been recorded when 
the observer was undergoing an Intense emotion or 
was being anaesthetized: these were difficult. When 
a companion of mine accurately reports the variegated 
coloring of a sky at sunset, he Is Introspecting; when 
the patient tells the doctor the medicine tastes bitter, 
it is as good a bit of Introspection as can be found any- 



6 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

where. The literal meaning of the word suggests 
'^looking within", because in the historical development 
of psychology it was supposed that we had an ''inner 
sense" which did the reporting; or that the mind re- 
sided within the body. Both of these notions have 
since been proved not only erroneous but ridiculous. 
One ''inner sense", by an easy logic, leads to an infinite 
number of "inner senses", as Aristotle early pointed 
out; but his successors paid little attention to him! 
Consciousness inherently means this awareness and its 
consequent report if called for. Likewise, while it is 
an interesting pastime to study the various places in 
the body where philosophers from time immemorial 
have allocated the mind, we now know that you can- 
not conceivably place something that has no physical 
dimensions, like the mind, into a physically measur- 
able body. Introspection then means nothing more 
than a careful examination of mental processes report- 
ed preferably in psychological terms. If the processes 
were not examined while they were going on, then they 
may sometimes be scrutinized immediately afterward : 
this is called retrospection. Emotions, instinctive and 
habituated performances, and dreams are frequently 
analyzed by retrospection. 

Recently psychologists have heard and read much 
concerning another method. A few of them have even 
vx^ithdrawn into a reform school known as behaviorism. 
The observation of the behavior of animals, including 
both man and the lower animals, has long been a sup- 
plementary method of psychology. With a human 
observer reporting his introspections it is often con- 
sidered wise and even necessary to add whatever in- 
formation the experimenter can gain by way of ob- 
serving eye-movements, facial expressions, or manner 



INTRODUCTION 7 

of speaking, and to interpret these bodily expressions 
in terms of introspective data either of the subject or 
of the experimenter himself. The behaviorists, how- 
ever, are planning to do away with introspection en- 
tirely and to study mind from the behavior of the 
reflexes of the body, from the movements made, or 
even from chemical analyses of the secretions of 
glands. One of them is now at work studying young 
babies from this point of view. What the result will 
be is hard to predict: we shall probably learn a vast 
deal more about the reflexes and the emotions. We 
have already obtained much valuable information con- 
cerning sensory discrimination and associative con- 
nections. 

Introspection, retrospection, and the observation of 
behavior cannot furnish mental facts and laws to the 
science of psychology unless they are carefully con- 
trolled so that we know practically all the conditions 
under which the mental processes which we are exam- 
ining are occurring. We should like to observe these 
processes repeatedly under the same conditions; we 
should like to change the conditions under guidance; 
and in some cases we should like to isolate the con- 
ditions. The same rigorous care that the chemist or 
the physicist takes with material objects must now be 
exercised by the psychologist in his dealings with mind. 
For that reason most of our results date from the 
establishment of the first psychological laboratory in 
1879; and nearly all experiments are now performed 
under strict laboratory conditions. Introspection, re- 
trospection, and the observation of behavior are scien- 
tifically valueless unless they are experimentally con- 
trolled and the conditions painstakingly recorded. 

4. Mind and Body. — Much in the past has been 



8 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

written about the relation of mind and body. Most of 
this is philosophical discussion, and therefore does not 
concern us here. We have seen how illogical it is to 
confuse mind and brain or to station mind anywhere 
in the body. But whatever our philosophical inter- 
pretation of this relationship may be, the fact remains 
that mental changes are frequently accompanied by 
bodily effects such as changes in breathing, circulation, 
digestion, the secretions of various glands, and other 
organic reflexes. Also bodily changes are accompan- 
ied by mental effects. Drugs seriously interfere with 
a man's way of thinking; and a bad liver may make 
a man mentally disagreeable. For that reason trained 
psychologists are usually well instructed in the intri- 
cacies of the human body and especially of the nervous 
system. The physiological and anatomical sciences 
do not contribute any new facts concerning mind, but 
they aid in the explanation of facts already discovered 
in the psychological laboratories. Many theories of 
mental function have reference to the physiology of 
the body. 

5. Scope. — We have indicated that the objects of 
psychological study are mental phenomena. But men- 
tal phenomena may be discovered in many directions. 
An elementary text-book usually confines itself to the 
scientific study of mind as found in general in the 
normal adult human mind. It is the study of the typ- 
ical mind as we best know it. After we have the 
standard mind well portrayed, then we can go on with 
the study of the more unusual, and perhaps for that 
reason the more interesting, forms of mental phenom- 
ena. 

The more important branches of psychology follow : 
^estigate the variations of mental process, 



If we investigate the variations 



INTRODUCTION 9 

capacity, or function from individual to individual, 
we enter the field of what is known as differential 
psychology, or the psychology of individual differ- 
ences. A study of abnormal minds, both subnormal 
and supernormal, both defective and unusually efficient, 
brings us within the realm of what is known as ab- 
normal psychology . When minds show diseased con- 
ditions, by way of temporary disturbances such as 
hysteria, or by way of the permanent insanities, patho- 
logical psychology or psychopathology investigates 
them. Psychotherapeutics is the study of mental 
healing. Child psychology gathers facts concerning 
young human minds, while genetic psychology treats 
the child mind, the primitive mind of the race, or the 
various minds of animal forms as a growing develop- 
ment. Comparative psychology compares mind with 
mind, whether it be the lower animal mind with the 
higher form found in man, or the minds of dififerent 
lower animals with each other, in order to throw light 
on the complex mind found in man. When the animal 
mind is studied for its own sake, it is called animal 
psychology. Minds influenced by the conscious pres- 
ence of other minds are discussed in social psychology. 
The psychology of races and the psychology of peoples 
are known respectively as racial psychology and ethnic 
psychology, or sometimes less exactly as folk psy- 
chology. Physiological psychology undertakes to exam- 
ine the underlying bases of nervous, muscular, and 
glandular action in connection with the explanation 
of mental phenomena. 

Then there are problems related to other professions, 
to the arts, and to the industries. Educational psy- 
chology is of great assistance in the complicated task 
of training children in the schools, students in the col- 



10 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

leges, employees in industry, even men in the army. 
Business men are now looking to psychology to help 
them solve the problems of advertising, of the ''labor 
turnover,'' the selection of men for positions, and the 
vocational guidance of men preparing for and seeking 
a position. Much of the selection of men in the army 
by means of psychological tests is applicable to busi- 
ness conditions. The anti-social types that bring grief 
and disaster to society are diagnosed if possible in ad- 
vance of the commission of crime. The lUinois state 
law, and the laws of som.e other states as well, give 
the trained psychologist a legal position on a par with 
the medical officer in the court-room. Besides mental 
examinations this officer makes examinations of wit- 
nesses and in other ways brings his psychological 
knowledge to bear on the case. But psychology has 
also been applied to the arts and especially to musical 
performance in order to study the needs of an in- 
dividual and his peculiar aptitudes for the various 
musical instruments. 

6. Summary. — Psychology is not a magical art, but 
it is a scientific attempt to study mental phenomena 
under strict laboratory conditions of introspection, ret- 
rospection, and behavior. In place of the "souF' 
psychologists study the mind and its phenomena wher- 
ever found. The mind is the complete organization of 
processes in any individual case: all the thoughts, 
emotions, ideas, perceptions, and actions from birth 
to death, while consciousness applies to momentary 
awarenesses. But this mind, though closely related 
to the body, is not resident in it. For the study of 
mind the psychologist goes to many different sources, 
touches some other subjects very closely, and incident- 
ally is assisting many arts, professions, and even busi- 
ness interests in the problems that confront them. 



INTRODUCTION 11 



Re:vii:w Questions 

1. What two false attitudes have prevented a proper 

understanding of psychology? 

2. Define psychology, mind, consciousness, introspec- 

tion, behavior, social psychology, psychopathology. 

3. Distinguish between being interested in mental 

phenomena and being self-interested. 

4. Clearly indicate the difference between mind and 

hrain, psychology and physiology, experiences 
and physical occurrences. 

5. Name five other sciences which have become af- 

filiated with psychology in the search for knowl- 
edge. 



CHAPTER II 

SENSORY EXPERIENCE 

7. SENSATION. — Almost all psychologists are agreed 
that, whatever the other factors in mind may be, even 
the most complex mental processes v/hich can be found 
may ultimately be traced to sensory experiences, i. e., 
the experiences arising from the stimulation of our 
sense-organs. These are the first experiences to ap- 
pear in the child and in the race, and they form the 
foundation of all mental life. But for that very reason 
they are difficult to recognize. Sensory experiences 
in their purest, elementary form are rarely if ever 
found in the complex mental life of the human adult. 
It has been a long mental history from the animal 
form, whose consciousness consisted only of sensation, 
to the human mind of today; and even the child mind 
from its earliest moments, when it is aware only of 
sensations, soon develops by leaps and bounds to a 
much more complex organization. Several examples 
will suffice to illustrate the pure essence of sensory ex- 
perience — the sensation. 

Suppose we are awakened in the morning by a rum- 
bling sound in our ears. We are not fully awake, just 
awake enough to hear the sound. Before we are able 
to attach any meaning to the noise, that is before we 
even barely recognize it as the passage of a heavy 
truck over the rough pavement, we experience the 
simple noise quality of the rumble. If the rumble is 
itself a simple noise, that would be a sensation. A 
very pure tone, as the tone produced by a carefully 
made boat whistle, heard under similar conditions, 
would be a pure sensation. Again, if an experimenter 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 13 

shows his observer a white piece of paper and the 
observer is able to strip his awareness of that paper 
of all of its significance, subtract the meaning of 
''paper'' or surface or material of any kind, even re- 
move the tendency to name the quality ''white'' or 
anything else, but experience just the quality of white- 
ness as a junco-sparrow would see the whiteness of 
snow, then it is likely that the sensory experience has 
been reduced to lowest terms. 

8. SE:NSE:-QuAr.iTiES. — It is furthermore indicative 
of the progress of psychology since Aristotle that, as 
mental analyses became more and more refined, the 
larger grew the number of distinct sense-qualities. In 
place of the original number of five, almost fifty thous- 
and separate qualities have been enumerated. Some of 
these are more alike in quality than others, and some, 
like those of smell and noise, have not yet been satis- 
factorily analysed and counted. As scientific inves- 
tigation proceeds, mx)re qualities will probably appear 
and some others of those already known may develop 
to be other than qualitative. For purposes of classi- 
fication it has been convenient to follow very closely 
the sense-organs involved, but in certain cases there 
seems to be a psychological similarity in quality even 
though the sense-organs are much different in struct- 
ure and location. Some day when facts are more 
clearly ascertained, we may depart from this tradition- 
al classification of sensory groups ; for the most part, 
however, the chief qualitative characteristics are in- 
dicated by the group. 

9. Auditory Se^nsations. — Sensations of sound, 
or auditory sensations, are usually subdivided into 
those of tone and those of noise. By far the greater 
amount of experimental work has been done on tones. 



14 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

Tones that are most familiar to us are not pure tones, 
but contain, as one can easily discover by careful at- 
tention, an entire series of tones, which are higher 
than the principal tone. In bells, however, some of the 
tones are lower than the principal one to which the 
bell or chime is tuned. All of these tones, variously 
called partials, overtones, harmonics, and undertones 
or ground tones, bear a very simple physical relation 
to each other. The vibration rates are simple multi- 
ples of the fundamental tone. It is predominantly by 
means of this series of pure tones in the complex that 
we are enabled to distinguish the quahty of one voice 
from that of another, or to recognize the melody car- 
ried by the violin as distinguished from that of the 
cornet in the phonographic record. But if we are 
careful to experiment with pure tones we come to the 
conclusion that the average person can hear about 
eleven thousand distinct tonal sensations from the very 
lowest tone of about 16 complete vibrations per second 
to the highest tone of about 40,000 vibrations per sec- 
ond. Introspectively, of course, the observer knows 
nothing about the vibration-rates : they are physically 
determined ; but he does notice a change in pitch from 
the low to the high tones ; that is, he has pitch discrim- 
ination. This discrimination is naturally much more 
refined than the series of musical notes which we use 
in our tempered musical scale. There are only about 
a hundred of these notes, ranging from about 40 vib- 
rations to 4000 vibrations, but whenever the instrument 
on which the musician is performing is not already 
tuned to the notes, as for instance in the case of the 
violin or the voice, then this pitch-discrimination Is 
utilized in producing the exact tone required. Below 
and above the region of distinct tonal sensation we 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 15 

hear nothing but noises. Some writers state that in 
combination with the 11,000 pitch quahties, there are 
to be noticed the qualities of diffusion. It is claimed 
that the low tones in addition to being low in pitch are 
roomy, diffuse, big ; while the high tones are thin, con- 
stricted, small. It is significant that almost all of the 
pitch names assigned to notes in the various languages 
are suggestive of spatial conditions; and yet many 
authors point out that tones, though possessing this 
attribute of diffusion, really lack extension in space. 
One does not estimate a tone as being so many feet 
square. Recently, also, we have read considerably con- 
cerning the vowel quality of tones, the low tones sound- 
ing like "u" in "duke", then like "o" in "show", the 
next like "a" in "palm", the next like "e" in "fete", 
and the highest of all like ''i" in "machine". But not 
enough is yet known about these matters to speak with 
certainty concerning them. 

Noises are often classified into two large classes of 
explosive and continuative noise. A thud, crack, or 
snap would indicate the former; and the roar, roll, 
and hiss, the latter. But these differences seem to be 
largely matters of the duration of the noise and not 
of inherent quality. There is no doubt, however, con- 
cerning the fact that noises possess the quality of 
pitch as can be easily verified from the use of the 
xylophone in band music. 

10. VisuAi. Sensations. — ^Just as 11,000 auditory 
sensations of tone and a still unanalysed number of 
noises have taken the place of a single sensation of 
hearing, so the one sensation of sight has been differ- 
entiated into about 35,000 separate qualities. Visual 
sensations can be described in terms of one or more 
of three systems of quality. First of all there is tint 



16 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

which means the lightness or darkness of the sensation. 
To the whites, grays, and blacks only this quality can 
be assigned ; they lack the other two. Then there is 
hue, which signifies the quality in terms of such usual 
color-names as violet, blue, yellow, orange, etc. The 
principal psychological hues are a slightly purplish red, 
green, blue, and yellow. When we speak of blue be- 
ing dark or light, we mean that the hue remains the 
same, but that the tint changes ; when we try to match 
a dark blue to a green of equal darkness, the tints are 
the same but the hue is different. Finally we notice 
qualitative changes in saturation ; that is, the hue may 
be very rich and pure in quality or it may be dead, 
dull, vv^ashed out in appearance, and ultimately hardly 
distinguishable from gray, or any degree of satvir- 
ation between these extremes. For exam.ple, we might 
take some bright red water-color of medium tint 
and gradually mix with it proportionate amounts of 
white and Mack. If we keep the amounts of black 
and white absolutely proportionate and mix them more 
and more with the red, the red becomes lifeless and 
subdued ; it loses saturation. Some qualities that or- 
dinarily pass for different hues are really variations in 
tint and saturation. Pink is a red, made lighter in tint 
and somewhat less saturated; buff is a yellowish 
orange, light in tint and unsaturated; brown is an 
orange, dark in tint and unsaturated. We can disting- 
uish 150 differences in hue without much change in 
tint and saturation; and we are capable of discrimin- 
ating about 700 differences in tint value from the ex- 
treme whites through all the grays to the deepest 
blacks. 

When the 150 hues are arranged in order around a 
psychological color-band, we find no gaps or breaks 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 17 

in the band to allow for the "ultra'' reds and ''ultra" 
violets, because in psychology there are no "ultras": 
everything not represented by conscious experience is 
excluded. So we can begin with any hue and go 
around the color-band back to the place where we 
started. Let us begin, for example, with blue ; we pass 
on through the violets, purples, reds, oranges, yellows, 
olives, greens, blue-greens and back to the blues. If 
we make this a circular band, then by passing over 
the diameter to the hue at the other end, we find the 
antagonistic or complementary hue. Thus red and 
green, blue and yellow, olive and purple, orange and 
blue-green, are complementary hues. 

The laws of color mixture usually state that (1) the 
mixture of any two complementary colors in the prop- 
er proportion produces gray; (2) the mixture of any 
two uncomplementary colors produces an intermediate 
hue; and {'i) a mixture of two mixtures, each of 
which has resulted in a given gray, will itself produce 
the same gray. These laws can easily be demonstrated 
by rotating color-mixers or even by spinning tops with 
colors mounted on them. A neat application of the 
first law of color-mixing is the common practice of 
dying white goods with a light bluish tint before they 
are put on the market. The blue combines with the 
light yellow, a color induced by aging of the cloth, and 
the result is a faint gray which seems to be more pleas- 
ing and salable than the light yellow. Bluing used 
in washing produces the same effect. 

There are some very well marked physiological pe- 
culiarities which have to be taken into account in the 
discussion of visual sensations. If the left eye is 
closed and the right eye fixated on a spot drawn on 
a piece of paper which also contains two and one-half 



18 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

inches to the right of the spot, a well marked cross, 
the latter will normally become invisible at a distance 
of from eight to ten inches from the eye. This marks 
the bhndspot of the right eye, the place where the 
nerve enters the back of the eye on the nasal side and 
where there are consequently no sensitive end-organs. 
A similar area can also be found in the left eye. 
Then, too, the normal eye is capable of seeing all the 
hues only around the area of central fixation; in the 
next zone, reds and greens disappear ; and finally in the 
outer zone, no hues are visible at all. In the outer 
zone a government gold certificate could not be told 
from a silver certificate; but, curiously enough, move- 
ments are most readily detected. There are, of course, 
many cases of partial color-blindness, especially to the 
reds and greens. It is estimated that about three per 
cent or more of the male population and a little less 
than two per cent of the female population are color- 
blind. Total color-blindness is much rarer; in which 
cases gray sensations take the place of all the colors. It 
is also of interest to note that with oncoming darkness 
we steadily become blind in the immediate center of 
vision. As a matter of fact, there are two sets of nerve 
endings in the retina of the eye: the rods for night 
vision, and the cones for daylight vision. 

11. Tactuai. Se:nsations. — In this sense depart- 
ment we have another illustration of the results de- 
rived from experimental procedure; it is one of the 
last to submit to analysis. Although physiologically 
the function of corresponding sense-organs has not 
yet been fully established, psychologists have demon- 
strated beyond doubt that the ancient single sensation 
of touch has at least four different qualities. These 
are cutaneous pressure, pain, warmth, and cold. One 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 19 

or more of these qualities may presently be subjected 
to further analysis; but, as they stand, they are in- 
trospectively quite different sensations. The first is 
similar to the old "touch'' sensation; the second used 
to be confused with the emotionally unpleasant ex- 
perience of discomforture or ''painf ulness" ; and the 
last two were considered as variations of a single 
''temperature'' sense. As a matter of fact, not only 
are these four qualities introspectively different, but 
even a crude exploration of the skin with a dull lead- 
pencil will demonstrate the fact that they are not all 
to be stimulated at the same places on the skin : there 
are places where pain is felt, but not pressure ; warmth, 
but not cold ; and so on. The skin is indeed a patch- 
work of little spots which are sensitive to some kinds 
of stimulation and not to others. 

12. Organic and Kin^sthe^tic Sensations. — 
Closely associated with the last group, and historically 
an outgrowth of it, is a fourth class of sensations 
which belong peculiarly to the body ; in being conscious 
of them we usually assign them to disturbances in our 
own organism and not to objects in the outer environ- 
ment. Partly for this reason, partly for the reason that 
they are almost constantly with us as a background to 
our general consciousness, and partly because of the 
fact that stimulation of them from without the body 
takes place through the medium of the skin and results 
in an accompaniment of tactual sensations with which 
they are frequently confused, they were for a long time 
left out of account. Some writers originally called 
them a "common" sense. The organic sensations are 
not yet well classified or described because they are 
difficult to investigate. For the most part they consist 
of sensations arising in the thorax and abdomen, from 



20 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

the movements and secretions of the larger vital organs 
inside of the body. Recent experimentation seems to 
indicate, however, that there are no new qualities to 
be found in these regions, that the qualities are very 
much like some of the tactual qualities or some of the 
qualities presently to be discussed under the kinaesthetic 
group, but much less definitely and accurately local- 
ized. More research in this group is needed and is 
probably forthcoming. 

The kinaesthetic sensations are better known and 
classified. They are sensations arising from bodily 
movements, and consisting of three distinct qualities, 
with a possible addition of two other qualities which 
are more or less assumed but not introspectively 
analysed or confirmed. The sensation of muscular 
pressure is experienced when some heavy object 
rests on a large bundle of muscular fibres, for 
example on the biceps or on the muscles of the 
forarm, thigh, or back — a dull, diffuse, heavy sense- 
quality, the large component of the fatigue complex. 
Another kinaesthetic sensation is the thin, strain 
quality found in the tendinous sensation, so-called 
from the fact that it arises from sense-organs in 
the tendons and is most frequently felt in those 
places, like the ankle, wrist, or sides of the forehead, 
where tendons abound. Then there is the articular 
sensation of friction arising in the joints and common- 
ly felt when the finger is pushed and rotated against 
its joint at the knuckle. Whenever we move any por- 
tion of our body or even when the movement is ex- 
ecuted without our control, we experience one or more 
of these kinaesthetic sensations. 

There is a small group of two sense-qualities collect- 
ively called the static senses and usually classified 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 21 

under the same general heading as the kinaesthetic sen- 
sations. Of these, the ampullar sense, probably never 
becoming clear enough in consciousness to be intro- 
spected but entering into a complex of reflex move- 
ments and their conscious effects, is one which is 
aroused by rotation of the body or by stabilizing the 
body in any given position. It has lately been exten- 
sively investigated and discussed in connection with 
military aviation. Together with many other items it 
makes up the complex experience of dizziness. The 
other static sense, termed the vestibular sense is sup- 
posed by some psychologists to indicate any change of 
motion in the body, either from a position of rest to 
motion, or from motion to rest, or a variation in the 
amount of motion. This can be sensed without the 
aid of any other sensation, but it is again a question 
whether we have here a psychological or a physiologi- 
cal sensation; that is, whether the ''sensation'' ever 
takes form in its conscious antecedents. 

13. Gustatory Sensations.— The variety of taste 
qualities has suffered a sharp reduction : analysis does 
not always multiply; in this case it has markedly 
simplified matters. There are only four tastes : sweet, 
sour, salt, and bitter. The richness of tastes at a ban- 
quet table can be explained by a very simple laboratory 
experiment. If a small sample of carefully filtered 
coffee is given an observer who is blind-folded and 
cautioned not to inhale during the trial, and later a 
small quantity of tea of equal strength is applied to 
his tongue under the same conditions and with proper 
precautions as to rinsing his mouth, he will ordinarily 
be unable to sense the difference. In the same manner 
honey is confused with molasses, and wine with vin- 
egar. Introspection reveals the secret: other com- 



22 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

ponents than taste assist us in sensing what we com- 
monly call ''tastes". The most important of these aids 
is smell : we smell and taste at the same time. When 
we have a cold in the head so that smell does not func- 
tion in its normal capacity, our food tastes differently. 
Much of the flavor of food is really odor, as is decided- 
ly the case when even slight decay is detected. But 
there are other components. Cold mashed potatoes 
''taste'' differently than warm ones; granulated sugar 
"tastes" differently than does powdered sugar. The 
fact is that the tongue is capable of sensing tactual 
qualities in addition to the four tastes proper : warmth, 
cold, pain, and pressure. In addition a number of mix- 
tures of the taste qualities is possible. All these fac- 
tors taken together account for the great variety of 
so-called "tastes". 

The tongue shows, curiously enough, some of the 
peculiarities of the eye in the distribution of the sense- 
qualities. There is an insensitive area in the center; 
sweet is sensed at the tip ; bitter at the back ; sour at 
the sides, and salt generally over the whole surface 
outside of the insensitive area; but these areas vary 
somewhat from individual to individual, and with age. 

14. Oivi^ACToRY Sensations. — The classification of 
the qualities of smell sensations is in a very unsatis- 
factory state at the present time. We do not know 
how many qualities there are, but we suspect that there 
are a great many. The sensitive area is well inside the 
nasal passage and very difficult of direct stimulation. 
The best that has been done is to group the odors into 
nine classes, but the names applied to these groups 
suggest that the qualities are not named on the basis 
of any introspective description but in terms of char- 
acteristics belonging to the objects that arouse the 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 23 

odors. 

This is indeed a long roll-call of sensations, a list 
that may in the future be reduced, rearranged, or aug- 
mented; but the emphatic point to remember is that 
each and every one of these many thousands of sen- 
sations is, by nature, at our present writing, as distinct 
as the ancient five senses were ever intended to be. 
These are the qualities; now a word about the quanti- 
tative aspects of sensations : we have discussed their 
nature, but not their degree or amount. 

15. Quantitative: Aspect o^ Sensations. — First 
of all, sensations vary in intensity. We may have hues 
and tints that are faint, others that are bright; sounds 
that are soft, others that are loud; odors and tastes 
that are weak or strong as the case may be. Every 
quality named in the classification may undergo chang- 
es in intensity from one extreme to the other. If con- 
ditions are kept favorable, variations in intensity can 
be made so small, that the increase or decrease is not 
noticed provided the ratio of change to the original 
quantity is kept within a certain constant limit, as, for 
example, Vioo for visual sensations, Yg for tonal 
sensations, Y20 for pressure; in taste, smell, warmth, 
and cold, the constant has not been as definitely deter- 
mined but is probably somewhat larger than any of 
the preceding. These facts are gathered together in 
a mathematical formulation known as Weber's Law. 
According to this law, it is claimed that, if other com- 
plications did not set in, a lobster might be boiled alive 
without discomfort to himself provided the increase 
of temperature remained below the constant for 
warmth ! Of equal interest is it to study at what point 
of physical intensity stimulation comes to the thresh- 
old of consciousness : at one moment it is not sensed, 



24 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

then with a slight increase it just begins to appear as 
sensation in consciousness. Another quantitative at- 
tribute common to all sensations is duration. A sen- 
sation miay be brief or long or any degree of duration 
between these extremes. Legato and staccato playing 
on the piano show chiefly variations in duration of the 
tones produced. A third quantitative aspect is exten- 
sity, or spatial area. Here we find differences of opin- 
ion, but some of the most reliable observers report that 
only some sensations, nam.ely visual, tactual, and prob- 
ably kinsesthetic, are extended. We cannot conceive, 
or for that matter perceive, a red quality that has no 
spatial dimensions, that is, that is theoretically like a 
mathematical point. But sounds are not of this char- 
acter, nor are the remaining sensations. Sounds, 
tastes, and smells do not require description in terms 
of dimension. A fourth characteristic of the degree 
of sensation is clearness^ although again there is not 
uniform agreement. When we discuss attention we 
shall understand the situation better. Experiences that 
are clear in mind are usually also strong in intensity, 
but they need not be. We can attend to the soft fem- 
inine voice at our side in spite of the tremendously loud 
attack on our ears of a passing military band. The 
faint trace of gray smoke on the horizon can become 
perfectly clear to our vision in spite of the glare of the 
sunlit sea. Since we have thus an independent varia- 
tion in the sensation, a new attribute is necessary ; and 
that we call clearness. 

16. A]^te:r-Imag:e:s. — ''Image" leads one to think 
that we are to describe either something that is akin 
to the stuff that imagination and memory are made of, 
or to some visual sketch, or outline, like the reflected 
image in a pool of water. But the effects described 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 25 

under this term have primarily to do with sensation, 
and are furthermore not at all limited to visual sen- 
sations but relate to practically every group of sensa- 
tions. The most pronounced effect is visual : if any 
quality is experienced for some time, the opposite qual- 
ity comes to consciousness. Red produces an after- 
image of green, blue produces yellow, black produces 
white, and so on. Those effects are really sensory in 
character and, save for historical usage, should be 
called after-sensations. The results just cited are in- 
stances of negative after-images because the effect is 
opposite in quality to that of stimulation. In this 
sense, negative after-imasfes are peculiar to visual 
sensation. There is a positive after-image in pract- 
ically every sense department, lasting only a short time 
after the stimulation ceases and increasing in effect 
with brief stimulation. 

17. Adaptation. — The longer a given stimulation 
is experienced the less intense it becomes and m.ore and 
more does it change its qualitative nature. All hues 
tend to become gray ;and all tints in time become middle 
gray. That does not mean that we become accustomed 
to the red light of the photographic dark-room in the 
sense that we do not notice it ; rather we become physi- 
ologically incapable of sensing the red as such. Prac- 
tically all sensations show this effect, but none more 
definitely than visual, tactual, olfactory, and gustatory 
sensations. The cook in the kitchen and the chemist 
in the laboratory literally become less conscious of the 
peculiar olfactory qualities easily sensed by the vis- 
itor. 

18. Mixtures. — ^\Ve have already discussed mix- 
tures of physical color-effects in vision. It is quite 
clear that in this case sensations are not mixed because 



26 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

no amount of introspective analysis can reveal the 
qualities contained in a mixture of papers producing 
gray: they may be composed of colors, dozens of them, 
or simply of black and white ; but the observer cannot 
tell the components until the rotation is slowed down, 
or by inference. The mixture of weak sweet and salt 
solutions also produces an effect of ''flatness'' that, 
like visual mixtures, cannot be analyzed. With music- 
al analysis the situation is quite different : an opening 
chord sounded by an orchestra cannot only be differ- 
entiated into separate notes but an expert can tell what 
instruments are contributing to that total sound. The 
same statement, of course, is true of an ''amen'' ren- 
dered by a quartet. But tastes also blend to produce 
new tastes, and these can frequently be analyzed into 
component parts. Milk chocolate easily reduces to 
sweet, bitter, a certain "oily" pressure, with sometimes 
an astringent pressure added. Smells blend to produce 
new^ odors or to cancel the qualities altogether, both 
of which effects, like visual mixtures, cannot be intro- 
spectively reduced to the constituent elements : the one 
is illustrated by combining xylol with turpentine, the 
other by mixing tolu balsam and iodoform. A good 
many deodorizers operate according to the latter prin- 
ciple; others combine with the objectionable odor to 
produce a pleasant one. Heat, burn, cool, and wetness 
are tactual mixtures. Fatigue and dizziness are com- 
plexes of organic and kinsesthetic components. 

19. Contrast. — In some sense departments the 
presence of two dissimilar qualities of sensation in con- 
sciousness at the same time enhances their respective 
effects. Strips of blue and yellow, olive and purple, 
red and green, black and white, show these qualities 
to advantage because they are placed close together. 



SENSORY EXPERIENCE 27 

Vivid hues have pronounced effects on neighboring 
hues or tints even when the reciprocal effect is not so 
noticeable. Certain colors of clothes, furs, hats, and 
the like enhance or depreciate the effect of complex- 
ions. Contrasts are also to be found in taste, smell, 
and tactual sensations. Sugar, too weak to be tasted, 
becomes sweet to the tongue when salt is placed on 
another portion of the tongue. The contrasting effects 
of cold and warmth were known for many hundreds 
of years in the old experiment of dipping the two hands 
respectively in dishes of cold and warm water and 
then placing them simultaneously in a third basin of 
tepid water. To the one hand the water will seem 
warm, to the other cold. 

20. Summary. — ^We have now seen the vast array 
of facts known concerning the sense qualities ; we have 
furthermore tried to show how a quality can be isolat- 
ed, but how rare that isolated quality really is in actual 
unanalyzed experience ; we have drawn up a classifica- 
tion of thousands of sensations into six large groups, 
and have shown the development of these groups from 
the ancient five sensations; we have also had a word 
to say about the attributes of quantity : intensity, dura- 
tion, clearness, and extensity; and finally we have 
briefly discussed certain phenomena more or less gen- 
eral to all groups of sensations. All of this is a neces- 
sary preparation for the subsequent consideration of 
functions and processes of mental life. 



28 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 
Re:vii:w Que:stions 

1. Reduce to simple sensations the following ex- 

periences: (a) walking, (b) talking, (c) reading, 
(d) dressing, (e) eating. 

2. Describe the cover of this book in terms of hue, 

tint, and saturation. 

3. Show the advantages and disadvantages of using 

red and green light as important railroad signals 
in place of other colors. 

4. Draw up a complete classification of all sensory 

qualities. 

5. Describe the "touch" of a fountain pen in terms 

of the quality, intensity, duration, extensity, and 
clearness of sensations aroused. 



CHAPTER III 

PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 

21. Me:aning. — ^When we discuss perceptions we 
are on a level of mental development which is more 
complex than that of sensory experience and, there- 
fore, at our stage of development, nearer to everyday 
experiences. It was difficult to define a pure sensa- 
tion : most of the details about sensations are learned 
not, as it were, by photographing immediate exper- 
iences, but by analyzing the photograph. We know 
what we mean by perception directly from ordinary 
occurrences. We look out of our office window and 
get visual perceptions of other office windows with 
names painted on them and behind them other people 
at work; in the middle of July we have tactual per- 
ceptions of perspiration; we experience auditory per- 
ceptions of cars, wagons^ feet moving along the street; 
in the spring we have olfactory perceptions of the 
fragrance of peach blossoms ; we can perceive in terms 
of taste the sourness of milk or the sweetness of the 
coffee; and we can perceive in organic processes the 
headache which is discomforting us. In short the liv- 
ing organism, in perceiving, establishes certain rela- 
tionships between itself and its environment in the 
sense that it is aware of what is going on about it or 
even within itself. 

The relationships referred to are frequently inter- 
preted by the organism in terms of an inherited ten- 
dency or group of tendencies. Much of our aversion 
to certain sights, odors, and tastes, is due to racial 
experiences which have left traces in our nervous 
systems that are part of our heritage at birth. The 



30 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

perception of blood involves this type of meaning; 
similar in interpretation but also somewhat more com- 
plex is our perception of fright as expressed in an- 
other's face. Perceptions take on color, too, from 
other processes that happen to be in mind at the time. 
In business all of our perceptions tend to assume a 
"business'' meaning: the persons with whom we are 
associated in the office look business-like to us ; after 
office hours the same persons may be perceived in quite 
another setting. Even our tone of speech may natur- 
ally have changed. In the same way the perceptions 
of objects on the stage of a theatre are formed in ac- 
cordance with the setting. How ridiculous it is for 
an actor to whisper so loud that the whole audience 
can hear him, while another actor in the same room 
with him cannot ; or, for that matter, how strange for 
us to perceive a room with only three sides and those 
forming obtuse angles with each other! Again per- 
ception becomes colored with the associations from 
previous experiences which attach themselves to the 
perception of the object in terms of imagery. Out of 
an unexpected hiding place we take an old photograph 
of our boyhood home, a letter from a friend, or the 
button we wore during one of the Liberty Loan cam- 
paigns, and at once we are conscious of a flood of 
revived experiences which give life and significance to 
the perception. There are three ways, then, in which 
perception may interpret the relations of our selves 
to our environment: by inherited tendencies, by asso- 
ciated groups of complex mental processes, and by 
imagery which attaches immediately to the perception 
itself. This is the problem of meaning; and the last 
factor — immediate imagery — is the most important. 
22. Nature: oi^ Perce^ption. — The process of per- 



PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 31 

ception may then be described as that operation of 
mind which brings mind in touch with its immediate 
environment; mind becomes acquainted with its pres- 
ent surroundings primarily through perceiving objects. 
Analytically the principal portion of the perception is 
made up of sensations, sometimes several different 
kinds of them. We perceive an apple by biting into it, 
looking at it, hearing the sound of the teeth entering 
the substance of it, smelling the aroma of it, touching 
its smooth cool surface with lip, cheek, and hand, and 
by tasting its sweet-sour flavor. Here we have run the 
whole gamut of sense departments. Any one, several, 
or all of these corresponding sensations may enter into 
the perception of the apple. Some perceptions are, 
of course, much more restricted. In perceiving a tune, 
the chief items are auditory sensations, but in a good 
many individuals the kinaesthetic factors of humming 
the tune might accompany the sounds and form part 
of the perception. 

In addition to the sensations which form the essen- 
tial core of the perception there are attached images, 
which are carried over from previous experiences and 
are the principal conveyors of meaning. Every new 
book that we perceive carries in its texture mementoes 
of books previously seen. These reminders may be 
very obscure; a few images may stand for a good 
many meanings telescoped together, but their presence 
makes all the difference in the world between a per- 
ception of a strange voice and the perception of the 
voice of an old friend. 

23. QuAi^iTATivi: Perce:pTions. — When percep- 
tions are characterized chiefly by a union of several 
qualities of sensation they are commonly called quali- 
tative perceptions. The "taste" of coffee, consisting 



32 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

of the aroma — the bitter taste proper and the warm 
tactual sensation — is such a perception. The blending 
together of tones into a clang or a chord is another 
example. Sometimes the distinction is made between 
"complications" in which, as in the first instance, the 
qualities come from several different sense depart- 
ments, and ''fusions'' in which, as in the second in- 
stance, blending takes place in the same sense depart- 
ment. 

24. Spatiai, Perceptions. — By far the larger por- 
tion of work has been done on the subject of perception 
of space, both of area, that is of two dimensions, and 
depth or distance, the third dimension. Spatial per- 
ception can occur only in those sense departments 
which admit of the attribute of extensity : vision, touch, 
and kinaesthetics. We localize other sensations in 
space but we do not perceive space directly in terms 
of them. It is shown by experimentation for example 
that we localize sounds by noting differences in quality 
and intensity as these come separately to the two ears 
and by moving the head about until such differences 
are well marked. Smells are also given position in 
space and distance by relative differences in intensity. 
We have seen that visual and tactual sensations, and 
probably kinaesthetic sensations as well, are always 
experienced in terms of spatial size. When we per- 
ceive this extent, as when we make an estimate of it, 
we have a clear spatial perception of two-dimensional 
space. But we learn most clearly to estimate distance, 
or, what amounts to the same thing, the third dimen- 
sion or the thickness of objects facing us and seeming 
to us therefore as solid. Instead of looking out upon 
the world and perceiving it flat as in a photograph, it 
stands out as an aggregate of solid objects. This sort 



PERCEPTUAI. EXPERIENCE 33 

of spatial perception is called stereoscopic and the in- 
strument which enables us to see photographs or draw- 
ings in this manner is commonly known as the stereo- 
scope. The underlying principle is simple. 

The most important factor in stereoscopic percep- 
tion is the fact that each eye being trained on a given 
object of perception at an acute angle — an angle 
which grows more acute as the object comes 
nearer — receives a somewhat altered picture of that 
object. Even an amateur photographer knows that 
the view of a building depends upon the angle from 
which the picture is taken; moving from one street 
corner at a crossing to the other materially changes 
the picture of the building. So it is with our eyes, 
save that our eyes are nearly always taking different 
pictures at the same time; that is, we have binocular 
vision ; the exception occurs when the eyes are focused 
on the horizon or a far distant point. The disparity 
of the retinal images,^ as this is called, has occurred 
so long in the race, in those animals that have binocular 
or "two-eyed'' vision, that the nervous system is al- 
ready set for the interpretation of these as indicators 
of depth or distance. The same thing is true of the 
second factor that helps us to interpret distance : the 
amount of convergence of the two eyes when focused 
on an object. Not only are the pictures different 
but the adjustment of the muscles of the eye-ball to 
get this result are given to us in terms of amount 
of kinaesthesis ; the greater the pull, the closer the 
object, as in the case of the near end of an ap- 
proaching bridge; the more relaxed these muscles 
are, the farther off are the eyes ''sighted", as in 
the case of the far end of the bridge from the 
same position. The doubling of objects on either 



34 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

side of the fixation point is another indirect 
factor which contributes to the establishment of the 
third dimension. This can be easily demonstrated by 
holding a pencil in front of a pen and fixating the eyes 
on the latter ; the pencil then appears double. Reverse 
the process with the objects in the same position but 
with fixation directed on the pencil; now the pen ap- 
pears double. The doubling of all objects not directly 
fixated, while generally unobserved with a high degree 
of attention, does nevertheless contribute '"filler" to 
our perception of space. 

But individuals with only one functional eye, that 
is one-eyed or monocular people, can still see objects 
as solid and locate them at varying distances; with 
practice they do it very well. For the ordinary individ- 
ual, not so habituated, this is difficult. A ring suspended 
from a lighting fixture is a very poor target for the in- 
sertion of a pencil at arm's length with one eye closed. 
Of course when the other hand is holding the ring the 
trick is much easier because we can get relative estima- 
tions of distance from the movement of our muscles. 

There are a number of items that contribute to the 
perception of distance or depth in monocular vision. 
Parallel lines converge in the distance, and the position 
of objects along these lines can thus be interpreted. 
Well known figures are absolutely and also relatively 
larger when near at hand ; shadows and the outlines of 
the figures are better defined and more distinct. Shad- 
ows themselves, as every artist well knows, lend depth 
to objects; near objects, furthermore, partially hide 
objects farther off; and then there is the purely physi- 
ological factor which may give an unconscious setting, 
namely the automatic adjustment of the lens of the 
eye to the distance, known as accommodation. 



PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 35 

Before we leave spatial perception, tactual space 
perceptions must also be mentioned. For many decades 
it has been maintained that all tactual sensations come 
to consciousness with a ''local sign'' designating quali- 
tatively the part of the body stimulated: we would 
have for example not merely ''warm sensation'' but 
"v/arm sensation from the sole of the foot". Intro- 
spection, however, fails to reveal such an additional 
quality: we localize usually by some other group of 
sensations ; or the local setting is given unconsciously. 
But we can very well distinguish spatial forms that 
are applied to the. skin, in which sense we have a tac- 
tual spatial perception. In the same way we experience 
spatial relations through kinsesthetic sensations when, 
for example, we trace an outline in the air of a 
canoe or of the figure "4". From earliest years 
through reaching for and walking toward objects we 
learn to estimate distance by movement. 

25. Temporal, P^rce^ptions. — Just as the exten- 
sive attribute furnished the basis for spatial percep- 
tions, so does the durational attribute of mental pro- 
cesses make possible our awareness of the lapse of 
time. When measured against actual physical dura- 
tion we find results similar to those of spatial percep- 
tion : relatively small areas and small units of time, 
when filled, are overestimated. A line drawn between 
two points on the page seems longer than the original 
space between the points ; so estimates of times lasting 
physically less than .75 seconds, when filled with rapid- 
ly occurring clicks, seem longer than the actual dura- 
tion. Contrasted with this, on the other hand, a dis- 
tance on the floor occupied by a line of people or the 
size of a hall filled with spectators, is underestimated ; 
and, as we know altogether too well, a long interval 



36 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOI^OGY 

of time seems short when we are in pleasant conver- 
sation with agreeable company, and seems long when 
we wait alone. In all cases the difference seems to 
depend somehow on the number of physical objects 
or events that occur, but more introspective analyses 
of the actual mental processes are needed. 

It is assumed, however, that the estimation of time, 
and therefore the perception of time, depends upon the 
process of mental organization — the method followed 
in the temporal perception. The smallest units of time, 
i. e., under .75 second in duration, are perceived prob- 
ably in the form of a rhythmical organization of the 
series of events ; those ranging from .75 second to 4 
seconds are apparently estimated in terms of the quan- 
titative characteristics of the mental processes them- 
selves and of associated processes; and units of time 
beyond this limit seem to be estimated only in terms 
of immediate memory or by retrospection. 

The problem of estimating the duration of time dur- 
ing sleep has also engaged the attention of psycholo- 
gists. It is commonly supposed that there is a sort of 
temporal perception which lies in the background of 
consciousness and which is based upon certain rhyth- 
mical physiological activities wh^'ch occur in the vital 
organs of the body. 

Allied forms of temporal perception are rhythm and 
melody. Rhythm consists of certain quantitative and, 
in some instances, qualitative changes of sensations 
that are systematically repeated until they become 
mentally organized into groups. Melody develops pitch 
changes until the entire series becomes a mental group. 
Rhythm may depend upon changes in duration of the 
members and of the intervals between the members, 
also upon changes of intensity, and, in the case of 



PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 37 

tones, sometimes upon pitch. These changes may not 
occur physically at all, as in the swinging of a well 
balanced pendulum or metronome, but they will be 
mentally attributed to the sensations that result. 
Rhythm may take place in terms of auditory, tactual, 
or visual perceptions and is usually accompanied by 
marked kinsesthetic sensations, such as keeping time 
with the foot, hand, or finger. Visual rhythms have 
occurred with the use of colored lights, or with lights 
differing in duration, brightness, or spatial arrange- 
ment. 

26. P^RCEjpTioNS 01? Move:mi:nt. — We perceive 
movement when an object crosses our field of vision, 
or even when we fixate the object and then move the 
head or body. Movement is frequently inferred when 
we see only successive positions of a moving object. 
Under some conditions our perception of movement 
is just as vivid when we are moving and the object is 
stationary, as in the_case of objects seen from a mov- 
ing train. Occasionally, however, we assume the move- 
ment of our selves when the object seen is in fact mov- 
ing, as in the case of a train moving out of the station 
on an adjoining track or in the experience at amiuse- 
ment resorts of a trip to the moon in a grass cage 
equipped with moving curtains depicting the imaginary 
sights on the way thither. But when we are led to 
perceive movement under circumstances that physical- 
ly reveal no movement at the point of fixation, as at 
a performance in the moving picture theater, then we 
have a peculiar type of perception of movement known 
as stroboscopic perception, and the laboratory appara- 
tus which produces this effect is known as a strobo- 
scope. The pictures are thrown on the screen in a long 
series of instantaneous exposures, for moving the film 



38 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

across the light from the lantern while we were look- 
ing at the screen would, of course, result in blurring 
the entire picture. Indeed we would see no picture 
at all. The same phenomenon may be noticed in those 
advertising signs that give the effect of movement by 
mechanisms which turn on series of lights showing 
successive positions of movement. The underlying 
explanation of these results is based on the presence 
of positive after-images which last through the inter- 
val when the light is periodically shut off. The same 
effect occurs, incidentally, in the field of tactual sen- 
sations when a number of points are successively 
touched on the skin — resulting in the perception of a 
moving object crawling over the skin. 

There is also a curious after-image of movement 
that occurs after long gazing at a waterfall or any ob- 
ject continually moving in a given direction; in the 
case of a waterfall, the landscape on each side of the 
fall appears to go up. 

27. IivLUSiONS. — -Perceptions sometimes do not serve 
the organism very well ; we are fooled into assumptions 
that are not correct. The subject is so large and has 
so many applications to problems of everyday life, 
even to the camouflage of war, that much restraint is 
required in order to treat it in a few paragraphs. 

There are three sense departments^ — visual, tactual, 
and kinsesthetic — especially the first two, in which il- 
lusions are very frequently encountered. In the vis- 
ual department are the well-known geometrical or 
optical illusions (a) of reversible perspective, indicated 
by the outline figure of a cube or a pair of crossed 
lines seen either projected forward or backward; 
(b) of variable or constant extent, as shown in alter- 
ations of equal distances by adding lines or by filling 



PERCEPTUAL EXPERIENCE 39 

in; (c) of variable or constant direction, illustrated in 
the alteration of the direction of parallel lines by using 
cross lines; (d) of associative areas and extents, as in 
the case of equal angles enclosed, in the one instance 
within a large angle and, in the other, within a smaller 
one; and (e) of combinations of various effects pre- 
viously enumerated. There are also visual illusions due 
to physical distortion through lenses, mirrors, and the 
atmosphere, e. g., the mirage ; and in hke manner there 
are physiological illusions due to effects produced with- 
in our sense organs : contrast and after-images. The 
visual illusions of movement, as the apparent move- 
ment of the moon am.ong the clouds, and the illusions 
of distance, as the nearness of a fire or the mountains 
in clear air, complete the list in this sense department. 

The tactual illusions include those (a) of juxta- 
position, referred to long ago by Aristotle in his ex- 
ample of the apparent doubling of a pea held between 
crossed fingers, and -illustrated by the reverse effect 
when the lobe of the ear is bent forward and dull 
compass points stimulate it and the side of the head 
in back of the ear at the same time, producing only a 
single sensation; (b) of parallel lines distorted when 
drawn across various parts of the skin as, for example 
across the mouth from ear to ear ; (c) of movement, as 
whan objects seem to crawl across the skin ; and (d) of 
the temperature effects noted by contrast from prev- 
ious stimulation. 

The kinsesthetic illusions are chiefly misrepresen- 
tations of weight due to suggestion derived from visual 
estimation of size, as in the well-known size-weight 
illusion. A sm.all container equal in weight to a large 
one will be overestimated in weight because of the 
unexpected effort required to lift it. There are many- 



40 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

other less well established illusions such as the lifting 
of objects from various heights. 

28. Summary. — We have seen that a perception 
involves the direct awareness of objects in our mental 
environment and that it is a relatively complex process 
made up principally of sensations with a background 
of images referring to past experiences and giving 
meaning to the perception. Meaning may also be had 
in terms of the association of other processes in the 
same consciousness and occasionally in terms of physi- 
ological tendencies some of which may be inherited 
from the past experience of the race. Then the qual- 
itative, spatial, temporal perceptions, and perceptions 
of movement were described in detail. Qualitative 
perceptions, like tonal fusions, depend principally upon 
the combination of different kinds or qualities of sen- 
sations; spatial perceptions depend upon the attribute 
of the extent of visual, tactual, and kinsesthetic sen- 
sations, giving rise to the awareness not only of area 
but also of depth and distance, due essentially, in 
vision, to the disparity of the retinal images and con- 
vergence of the eyes in stereoscopic perception and a 
number of factors in monocular vision; and temporal 
perceptions depend upon the attribute of the duration 
of all kinds of sensation. Rhythm and melody com- 
bine several attributes but are frequently classed as 
temporal perceptions. Illusions are illustrations of in- 
correct reports of the environment where the error 
lies principally in some factor of the physical situation 
or in the physiological disposition of the sense organ. 



PERCEPTUAI. EXPERIENCE 41 

Re^vikw Que:stions 

1. Name three ways in which perceptions may make 

our environment significant. 

2. From your immediate surroundings illustrate qual- 

itative, spatial, and temporal perceptions. 

3. What is the relation between stroboscopic percep- 

tion and the perception of movement; between 
stereoscopic and spatial perception? 

4. Outline according to sense department three classes 

of illusion. 

5. Give one example of each of the five classes of 

optical illusion. 



CHAPTER IV. 

IMAGINAIi EXPEKIENCE 

29. The: Image:. — It was difficult to describe the 
most fundamental of the elementary mental processes, 
the pure sensation, because it seldom occurs in our 
present complex mental life as an isolated unit apart 
from the other processes that are closely organized 
with it in the perception. In the simple image we have 
an additional difficulty in that, as we have before noted, 
the term suggests a visual diagram or outline. The 
fact is that we may have simple images similar to every 
known kind of sensation. 

30. ThK Simpi^e: Image:. — What is the simple 
image? Consider the melody of any naticfnal song. 
Most of us can hear the opening strain of ''The Star 
Spangled Banner'' as if some band were playing it or 
as if people were singing it; that is, we can hear it 
mentally in the absence of any immediate stimulation. 
The mental processes which are carrying that tune are 
known as images; but they are not at all simple: that 
melody is full of meaning, is frequently accompanied 
by bodily reactions in the form of organic sensations 
and feelings ; it arouses a host of associated processes. 
Take the first note, however, strip it of any meaning 
whatsoever, do not mentally ascribe to it a word or a 
musical name, but get the tone as purely as if blown 
lightly on the mouth of a bottle or as if produced by a 
lightly struck tuning-fork of that pitch, and you will 
probably have a simple image. In other words a sim- 
ple image is any qualitatively simple mental process 
which refers to an object recognized as not being im- 
mediately present to the senses. This reference fre- 



IMAGINAIv EXPERIENCE 43 

quently occurs just after the experience of the simple 
quaHty, as when a pecuHar sound is heard which later 
turns out to be the work of the imagination. Simple 
images belong to the second class of elementary mental 
experiences and are sometimes therefore called ''imag- 
inal elements''. A few writers have termed them 
"centrally aroused sensations'' because they are very 
much like sensations in character but are aroused 
physiologically at the central part of the nervous sys- 
tem, that is, in the brain, while sensations correspond 
to excitations at the terminal sense-organs. There is 
some question as to whether, stripped of all reference 
or meaning which the simple quality of an image or 
sensation soon acquires, there can actually be found 
any pronounced difference between the qualitative 
characteristics of an image and its corresponding sen- 
sation. Usually the image lacks the definiteness and 
insistence of the sensation; it is more vague, change- 
able, and is frequently weaker in intensity. Under 
ordinary circumstances an imaged tone is not as loud 
or as clear as one that is sensed. Under other condi- 
tions we are uncertain, especially at low intensities, 
whether the experience which we are having is being 
imaged or sensed; consequently, as Vv^e shall later see, 
hallucinations result. AVhere the stimulation takes 
place in our own bodies, as in the organic, kinsesthetic, 
and some of the tactual groups, v/e are even more con- 
fused on this point. It is often difficult to tell an imaged 
muscular pressure from an actual sensation of mus- 
cular movement : an incipient muscular twitch result- 
ing in a muscular sensation may be interpreted to 
mean an imaged experience, as the behaviorists would 
have us believe ; or reversely, as physicians well know, 
m.any painful experiences, taken to be actually sensed, 
are only very vividly imaged. 



44 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

31. Tut Quautie:s oi^ Images. — Substantially, 
images follow the same qualitative classification which 
was outlined under sensory experiences. We have 
auditory imagery when we hear melodies ''running 
through our heads'' ; we notice visual imagery when 
we ''see things with the mind's eye"; tactual images 
come with a "creepy feeling" or with the imaged soft- 
ness of plush; with the former, however, may fre- 
quently be found also deeper lying organic and kin- 
sesthetic imagery turning then into actual sensation, 
as when reading a ghastly story the "creepy feeling" 
gives rise to "goose-flesh" and the contraction of 
groups of muscles. Gustatory imagery can easily be 
recognized in the experience of opening a box of choc- 
olates and anticipating the bitter-sweet taste; and 
smell imagery is common to the memory of the mead- 
ows after a brief, refreshing rain or of "the pungent 
scent at evening in the cool hollows of burning brush 
heaps . . . and above all, the deep, earthy, moist odour 
of new ploughed fields." It is not altogether an easy 
matter to describe one's mental imagery with scientific 
fidelity because one type of imagery may be called in as 
a substitute for another. A psychologist who is also 
a good musician told me that he never had an auditory 
image in his life : all the melodies which he tried to 
recall came as muscular imagery of throat-adjust- 
ments, as in humming. So from an evening's dance we 
may carry away not the music of the orchestra in 
auditory imagery, nor the glitter of the costumes in 
visual imagery, but the fragrance of a corsage bou- 
quet which attracted our attention — and which there- 
fore will for a long time be associated with the dance. 
For accurate information on such matters it is con- 
sequently best to trust the introspections of a trained 



IMAGINAIv EXPERIENCE 45 

observer. The actual wealth of imaged qualities, 
moreover, while theoretically equal to the wealth of 
sensations, falls far short of it. It is possible to get 
700 tint values in sensory experience but imagery 
furnishes us with a much more limited number. 

32. The Quantity o^ Imagi:s. — In matters of de- 
gree we find the same parallelism with sensory exper- 
iences as there is in quality ; and with the same limita- 
tions. With respect to intensity, duration, clearness, and 
extensity, images follow the course described under 
sensations, save that they are almost invariably dimin- 
ished in quantity : less definite, weaker, and less durable. 
They lack the commanding powder of sensations. Ex- 
ceptional instances occur, however, but these will al- 
ways refer to the types that are really border-line cases. 
Instances of visually imaged colors have been reported 
with subsequent negative after-images. 

33. THii) Idi)a. — More familiar to our everyday ex- 
perience is the idea of the complex mental process 
built up on the basis of simple images. As we have 
seen, the image is not a very stable or definite process : 
it ranges from the sensory character of the after-im- 
age, through the experience found in synaesthesia, 
which applies to the peculiar sensing of tones as colors 
or as tastes and of other similar combinations, through 
the more removed memory after-images to be later 
discussed, through the so-called ''hypnagogic'' images, 
which, woven out of the tracings of previously seen ob- 
jects and of other visual effects, pass in review just 
before falling asleep, through the images which are 
mistaken for realities of the outside world and are 
therefore termed hallucinations — through all the fore- 
going images to the characteristic image which forms 



46 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

the foundation of the ideas of memory, imagination, 
expectation, and thought. It is the latter type which 
we are now prepared to scrutinize. 

Shut off from external surroundings, secluded from 
the multitude of challenges and assaults which the 
world makes upon us, we are still subject, sometimes 
distressingly, sometimes comfortably, to mental pro- 
cesses intimately connected with our past, present, or 
future experiences. Genetically they are born of past 
experience but they may hark back to all time and 
place. They are presumably peculiar to the higher 
animals, especially man; and they have contributed 
more to civilization than any other form of mental 
process. We know them scientifically as ideas ; and the 
mental function involving the use of ideas is termed 
ideation. Just as the perception cannot be without its 
core of sensations, so the idea must have its principal 
group of images. In addition, however, it is essential 
that the idea should refer to some object not at that 
moment present to the senses. 

34. Individuai, Dii^^i^r^nce:s in Idi^aTion. — It is 
a well-established fact that everyone is given to differ- 
ent methods of thinking, remembering, or planning. 
Even in such matters as piano-playing without score 
individuals vary widely. One sees the music printed 
out on the page of a familiar or preferred edition; an- 
other plays from the tune as it runs ''in the head'*; 
still another gets no notion of the tune until his hands 
begin ''tickling the keys''; again, a person may carry 
some melodies one way, some other melodies in an- 
other, and so on. These differences are well marked 
off into four types of ideation: the first type is the 
visual ; the second type is the auditory ; the third type 
the motor or kinaesthetic ; and the last a versatile or 



IMAGINAL EXPERIENCE 47 

mixed type. This classification does not mean, of 
course, that visuahzers, for example, never have any 
other sort of images; it indicates, however, that most 
of their ideas take the visual form by preference and 
habit. But it does mean that there are fairly definite 
ways in which we are set to do most of our mental 
work. The next time that you try to remember a 
catch-phrase which you have just heard, see how you 
go about it. Do you naturally write it down some- 
where and then recall it as it appears on the paper; 
or does the sound of the words repeat itself almost 
incessantly in your mind; or do you find yourself at- 
tempting to make the necessary movements in your 
throat to say it ; or do you do a little of each, or per- 
chance sometimes one, sometimes another? Since 
words imply both motor adjustment and the sound of 
the uttered expression, some authors name the second 
type as auditory-kinaesthetic or verbal. 

It is worthy of note at this point that persons totally 
blind from birth or even perhaps from the sixth or 
seventh year of age are incapable of having visual 
imagery, and for like reasons totally deaf persons have 
no auditory images or ideas — showing that, as regards 
ideational type, our mental life is dependent upon 
previous experience. The claim is also made and fair- 
ly well established that children have more pronounced 
visual im^agery than have adults : adult ideation tends 
to become verbal, due to the increasing use of language 
in our mental lives. Where planning requires dia- 
grams, sketches, and outlines, visuahzers have a tre- 
mendous advantage, whereas public speakers are much 
aided by auditory or kinsesthetic imagery. 

35. HaIvI^ucinaTions. — When we mistake our 
ideas for perceptions we are said to suffer from hallu- 



48 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

cinations. No one escapes this tendency, but if it be- 
comes persistent something is wrong. It occurs norm- 
ally in reverie, but it may also be a sign of overwork, 
old age, the use of certain drugs, especially opiates; 
or, in extreme cases, it may signify serious mental 
derangement. The inadequate function of the idea 
may be a matter of mistaken intensity, as a distant 
whisper may become unbearably loud; it may be a 
matter of form, as tombstones turning ghosts at night; 
or it may be a matter of quahtative interpretation, as 
a piece of gossip is changed to fit your frame of mind. 
In the extreme case there may be no sensory back- 
ground at all; the hallucination is then fashioned out 
of whole cloth or a figment of the mind. 

36. Summary. — We have described in outline the 
character of the simple image which belongs to the 
second class of elementary mental processes and forms 
the principal constituent of the idea. Although the 
simple image may have the same qualitative and quan- 
titative attributes as the sensation, in typical instances 
it is vaguer, less intense, and less stable than the sen- 
sation ; and while its variation from the sensation is 
gradual, it does exhibit the peculiar characteristics of 
a reference to objects that are mental, i. e., not immed- 
iately present to the senses. On this account many 
persons erroneously consider the subject of images and 
ideas the proper approach to the field of psychology. 
The idea, which is the complex process founded on 
imagery, is also subject to qualitative variation, but 
in the main individuals fall into four large groups with 
respect to the habitual use of visual, auditory, motor, 
or mixed imagery or ideas. Just as illusions were de- 
scribed as the incorrect functioning of perception, hal- 
lucinations were found to be the inadequate function- 
ing of ideas. 



IMAGINAI, EXPERIENCE 49 

Re^vie:w Que:stions 

1. What, in the psychological sense of the term, is a 

simple image? 

2. In what kind of imagery do you tend to remember 

the date and time of an appointment? 

3. From conversation with your acquaintances find 

examples of the four types of ideation. 

4. Which is more advantageous : auditory imagery to 

the musician, or visual imagery to the landscape 
painter ? 

5. In what mental complexes are images essential? 



CHAPTER V 

AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE 

37. Fe::^i,inc. — ^With feeling we come to an alto- 
gether different aspect of mental life and one which 
also is beset with difficulties arising from the technical 
use of popular terms. The word ''feeling'* is used 
with meanings ranging from the simplest awareness 
to the most complex judgment. Strictly it is used in 
psychology, however, in connection with the emotional 
or affective phase of mind. Besides the apprehension 
of our physical environment in terms of perception and 
the representation of it in terms of idea, mind is af- 
fected by feelings. In other words there are degrees 
of response to immediate or to more remote environ- 
ment in the form of affective or emotional coloring. 
We are not only capable of perceiving tones but we can 
also be pleasantly or unpleasantly impressed by them ; 
we are not only able to recall the social affair of last 
evening or to project tomorrow's concert into our 
future experiences, but it is also more than likely that 
these processes come with some degree of warmth. 
Whether it be the warmth of pleasantness and com- 
fort or of dislike and disagreeableness depends upon 
circumstances and the individual, but few experiences 
leave us cold and indifferent. Psychology designates 
this phenomenon, then, by the term ''feeling'' or "af- 
fection". When reduced to lowest terms of analysis, 
it is a simple feeling or affective element. 

38. Ai^i^e:ction. — Most psychologists agree that all 
of our affective experiences are resolvable into one or 
two qualitatively different simple feelings or affections: 
pleasantness and unpleasantness. The very least that 



AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE 51 

can be said of a mood or emotion or disposition is that 
it is pleasant or unpleasant. Some writers substitute 
agreeableness and disagreeableness, like and dislike, 
and one in particular specifies two additional pairs of 
qualities, but the first pair — pleasantness and unpleas- 
antness — are the ones most commonly adopted. In 
this particular field, however, there is perhaps less 
certainty than in any other so far discussed, since we 
are confronted with the spectacle of one authority 
asserting that the qualities of affection are innumer- 
able while another says that there are no affections at 
all — that the alleged "feelings" are nothing but very 
weak sensations ! For a long time, indeed, there was 
much confusion between the sensation of pain and the 
feeling of unpleasantness. Perhaps the next decade 
will bring us nearer to uniformity of opinion. 

The chief difficulties seem to lie in two main direc- 
tions. Besides the extreme limitation in the number 
of qualities we find that the simple feeling can never 
be observed as an isolated process: it does not lend 
itself to introspective analysis. It is always intimately 
related to some other process or group of processes. 
Instead of pursuing its own course with distinctive 
qualitative changes it suffuses itself over conscious- 
ness like a cloud of dust, a glow of warmth, or a chilly 
wind. In its most complex form it seizes upon the 
entire psychophysical organism, affecting both mind 
and body. As one writer has remarked, we are never 
glad, independently of anything else, but we are al- 
ways glad about something. In their lowest forms, 
simple feelings are usually allied to sensations or im- 
ages. Pleasantness or unpleasantness attach them- 
selves to tones, colors, tastes, and the like. Neverthe- 
less, we cannot therefore assign them as attributes to 



52 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 



these processes because the respective attributes are 
independently variable. A simple feeling of pleasant- 
ness may have an intensity and duration different, in 
degree and in course from those attributed to the sen- 
sation of color itself. 

The other handicap to psychological investigation 
is the fact that feelings lack the attribute of clearness. 
Attention cannot be directed on this process without 
its immediate disappearance from consciousness ; 
hence the impossibility of introspective report. 

39. Methods o:^ Investigation. — Recourse must 
consequently be had to two special methods of ob- 
servation, both of which are indirect in their appli- 
cation. One of these, the method of impression or of 
paired comparisons, demands an introspective report 
concerning the perception or idea, with only an in- 
direct reference to the attached affection; the other, 
the method of expression, depends upon the behavior 
of the sytems or circulation, respiration, and muscu- 
lar and glandular activity in the body under the reflex 
influence of the prevailing feeling. In the first meth- 
od a series of tones, colors, odors, or tastes is present- 
ed to the observer in pairs and in a prearranged man- 
ner, and he is required to report upon the affective 
response evoked. The clearest process, then, is the 
perception; the report only incidentally involves the 
simple feeling. In the other method, specialized in- 
struments are applied to record, usually through a 
pneumatic system, the bodily effects of pleasant and 
unpleasant perceptions and ideas; like the pneumo- 
graph, which records changes in rate and volume of 
breathing, the plethysmograph, which transcribes 
changes in rate and volume of superficial circulation, 
the sphygmograph, which transmits the rate of the 



AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE 53 

pulse, the ergograph, which measures the strength of 
vohantary muscles, and the automatograph, cousin to 
the ouija board, which registers the involuntary move- 
ments of the arm. 

40. S^nse:-FEEIvINGS. — From the simple feelings 
easily attached to other processes it is an easy step to 
those feelings that are characteristically bound up with 
a group of sensations so that they recur from time to 
time in practically the same pattern. These are the 
complex processes known as sense-feelings. Head- 
ache, hunger, thirst, dizziness, nausea, drowsiness, las- 
situde, and suffocation, are examples of groups of 
definite sensations accompanied by pronounced feel- 
ings that are arranged in a fairly stable organization 
of mental processes. 

41. Emotions. — But still more complex and much 
more widely recognized are the affective processes 
listed under the head of emotions. Emotions are defin- 
ite as to course, content, history, and function. The 
course in consciousness is precipitous at the beginning 
with many associated and incorporated processes; it 
flares up the moment the adequate perception or idea 
touches it off ; and it is slow to die down, coming only 
gradually to a conclusion. Reference to the typical 
emotions of fear and anger, love and hate, will readily 
confirm this statement. In content Vv^e have usually 
an inciting perception or idea which is at once organ- 
ized into a mass of other ideas and perceptions together 
with a characteristic complex of organic and kinaes- 
thetic sensations, leading frequently to some expressed 
or inhibited movement together with effects on the 
vital physiological functions of respiration, circulation, 
digestion, innervation, and on the secretions of vari- 
ous, especially the ductless, glands. The entire com- 



54 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

plex is strongly suffused with pleasant or unpleasant 
affection. The history of emotions, biologists tell us, 
leads us back to the time when emotions, intimately 
related to and not infrequently accompanied by in- 
stinctive reactions, were of prime importance in help- 
ing the animal survive an emergency of defensive or 
offensive attack or other equally essential crises. Emo- 
tions have lost much of this primitive function, but 
they probably still answer the purpose of introducing 
a wholesale change in the ideational sequence and 
organization of mind: producing a sort of temporary 
mental revolution to clear the atmosphere and tedium 
of mental life. But, of course, this is sheer theory. 

Neither a numerical count nor a qualitative classi- 
fication of emotions is available : on these points 
great divergence of opinion still prevails. One classi- 
fication, for example, is based upon a genetic differ- 
ence: the primary emotions, like fear and anger that 
do not depend on the individual's previous experience, 
as compared with the derived emotions, like remorse 
and pity that depend more on social traditions. An- 
other classification emphasizes temporal reference, as 
the immediately insistent emotions of joy and sorrow 
and the remotely insistent emotions of hope and fear. 

42. Se:ntimKnt. — When an emotion is governed 
not principally by the inherited tendencies deeply in- 
grained in the texture of mind, but chiefly by consid- 
erations developing out of social tradition and edu- 
cational influences, it gives place to a sentiment. 
Sentiments are farther removed from the instinctive 
bases of emotional expression and are more allied with 
the thought processes. Patriotism, friendliness, gra- 
titude, honor, esteem, and condemnation are senti- 
ments. 



AFFECTIVE EXPERIENCE 55 

43. Mood.— Sometimes emotions die an extremely- 
slow death or never fully embark on their career : they 
stay at low ebb for a long time. They are then more 
properly termed moods. A mood, then, is an affective 
process, usually more or less complex, that is relative- 
ly weak in intensity and long in duration. While an 
em.otion may expel mental processes not akin to it, a 
mood absorbs and colors them in the course of their 
appearance. 

44. Disposition and TempKramKnt. — ^W^hen an 
affective response becomes not only long in duration 
but an integral part of a person's mental texture or a 
habituated form of action, we speak of a disposition or 
temperament. If an individual has a temporary lapse 
and falls into a pessimistic strain, we say that he is in 
a pessimistic mood; but if he is known to be in that 
condition day after day and from his earliest days, 
we say that he is of pessimistic disposition or temper- 
ament. 

45. Passion. — An intense affective complex, usual- 
ly of short duration, coming precipitately to a focus 
and retreating in the same fashion, is a passion. It 
gains in intensity what it lacks in duration, nor has it 
the typical organization of an emotion. It is not as 
definitely integrated. All voluntary control is inhib- 
ited. 

46. Inte:re:st. — Objects are of interest to us when 
we attend to them with some affective response. It is 
a combination of a high degree of clearness and feel- 
ing, usually pleasant in quality. 

47. Summary. — The third class of simple mental 
processes includes affections or simple feelings, limited 
to the qualities of pleasantness and unpleasantness and 



56 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOI.OGY 

lacking the possibility of becoming clear processes in 
consciousness. They are not themselves items in con- 
sciousness but are readily attached to other processes. 
Consequently two indirect methods are in use in the 
investigation of feeling: the introspective method of 
impression or paired comparisons, and the behavior- 
istic method of expression. Emotions are very com- 
plex feelings but with an orderly and inherited pro- 
cedure. They are intimately related to instinctive 
forms of reaction, but have not yet been adequately 
classified. Sense-feelings, sentimicnts, moods, disposi- 
tions and temperaments, passions and interest are other 
forms of affective response. 



Re:vii:w Que:stions 

1. Explain why introspection is replaced in the field 

of affection by two indirect methods. 

2. Describe, possibly from your own experience, af- 

fection, sense-feeling, emotion, mood, sentiment, 
temperament, and passion. 

3. Make a list of your emotions in the course of a 

day and trace the instinctive reactions in each 
case. 

4. Contrast an emotion started by an idea with one 

initiated by a perception. 

5. How is interest related to feeling and to action? 



CHAPTER VI 

MENTAL ARRANGEI^IENT: ATTENTION 

48. Organization o^ Mind. — So far we have been 
chiefly concerned with the problem of analyzing mind 
into its principal and rudimentary parts : all mental 
experiences, however complex, may be introspectively 
reduced to groups of sensations, sim.ple images, and 
simple feelings. And on the basis of this analysis we 
are justified in ascribing certain functions to the vari- 
ous operations of mental processes : services which 
they render to each other, to the mental life as a whole, 
and ultimately to the psychophysical organism. They 
augment one another, give continuity to mind, and 
bring the organism in touch with its environment. But 
there still remains the problem of arrangemient of pro- 
cesses in point of time, both simmltaneously and suc- 
cessively. Mind is not only organized in regard to 
function — what each process does or means — but also 
in regard to prominence or obscurity of its processes. 
To every mental process that is com.plex, and to all 
simple ones except affections, there attaches the at- 
tribute of clearness, which we have already discussed. 
In other words, mind stands organized from, moment 
to moment with certain processes in the foreground 
and others in the background, but with a constant 
shifting of relative attentive clearness. Instead of 
proceeding on a dead level, certain processes momen- 
tarily become more significant, receive favored posi- 
tions, as it were, retain them for varying amiounts of 
time, and then again recede into the background. Here 
we are confronted with the problem of attention. 
Hysteria, hypnosis, sleep-walking, and certain mental 
derangements are intimately involved in the discussion 



58 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

of attention, but we must leave them to more detailed 
treatment in books especially devoted to these sub- 
jects. 

The normal human mind, therefore, is an orderly 
procession with certain processes standing out above 
the others, only to give way later on to still another 
group. In this way our minds are capable of respond- 
ing adequately to an environment that presents many 
more claimants for our notice than we can expedi- 
tiously handle. We have come to see, then, that atten- 
tion is nothing more than that state or condition of 
the mind in which mental processes are found in vary- 
ing degrees of clearness. The normal mind is always 
in a state of attention. Inattention simply means not 
that the mind is faihng to attend but that it is attend- 
ing to matters which for some reason are judged by 
others to be unworthy of clearest attention at that 
moment. Some abnormal minds are popularly con- 
sidered inattentive if attention is not directed long 
enough to the matter in hand, just as other abnormal 
minds are incHned to hold a few objects in a high 
degree of attention too long. ''Attention'' in such cir- 
cumstances has come to mean a high degree of atten- 
tion. 

While it is admitted that there may be some individ- 
ual exceptions, it is generally held that the most fre- 
quent type of mind shows only two levels of clearness, 
a level of processes of maximal clearness, or fore- 
ground, and a level of obscure or unclear processes in 
the background. In this type the degree of clearness 
between the two levels is marked. Several published 
experiments seem to indicate, however, that a multi- 
level type does occasionally occur in which there are 
as many as seven degrees of clearness. 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT: ATTENTION 59 

49. Subconsciousness. — Reference is often made 
to a somewhat mysterious subconsciousness, alluded 
to also as ''the subconscious''. The assumption made 
is that there is a second organization apart from the 
general waking consciousness in which memories lie 
dormant or buried, associations and even thoughts 
take place, and in which personaHties and selves are 
duplicated and sometimes multiplied. If it is treated 
as a mind somewhat out of reach of the normal con- 
sciousness, then it would be absurd to fathom it with 
introspective methods; and if it alternates with the 
normal mind in consciousness, then it is doubtful 
whether the term ''subconsciousness'' is entirely appro- 
priate. In most cases the expression covers ignorance, 
or at most an hypothesis. Psychologically, phenomena 
thus discussed fall more properly under the heading 
of attention and association; for we know that while 
we are occupied with processes in the foreground of 
consciousness we are nevertheless aware in an ob- 
scure way of sounds, sights, organic disturbances and 
even of ideational processes. We say that we do not 
notice the outlines of the sidewalk as we stroll, the 
buzzing of flies and fans while we write letters, or the 
ticking of clocks as we converse ; but should a blanket 
of snow obscure the first, should a change of room 
obliterate the second, should the stopping of the clock 
put an end to ticking, w^e soon become conscious of the 
difference : these phenomena are not present in another 
mind or consciousness, but in the background of the 
same consciousness. In some instances, as when we 
recall names after an unsuccessful attempt, we seem 
not to be aware of the corresponding processes and it 
is as good a guess as another to say that they develop 
physiologically, that is, outside of conscious exper- 



60 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

ience. There is no need, however, for postulating an 
inaccessible mind at this level and calling it "the un- 
conscious'', as is done in some texts concerned with 
abnormal psychology. 

50. The: Rang^ oi? Atte:nTion. — One of the im- 
portant problems in the psychology of attention in- 
volves the number of processes that can be held 
momentarily in the clear focus of consciousness. One 
hears about individuals who are capable of doing many 
things at once, like dancing, reciting a poem, and writ- 
ing separate articles with each hand. History has it 
that Caesar was able to dictate as many as seven let- 
ters at the same time. In such instances it is not 
established that all of these processes are strictly sim- 
ultaneous : it is very likely that they rapidly oscillate 
in clearness at successive moments. 

Many types of apparatus, generally called tachisto- 
scopes, have been devised to meet the technical require- 
ments of this problem. It is necessary to test the num- 
ber of items that can be held in clearest attention at 
a single moment. The period examined must there- 
fore be very short to prevent roving of attention, but 
it must be long enough to make the objects visually 
clear. The average time of exposure is about one- 
twentieth of a second. The instruments used 
have a variety of forms in an attempt to over- 
come certain much discussed deficiencies, but the 
essential provisions are (1) a fixation-point to 
prepare the observer for the field of exposure, 
(2) the rapid, smooth, and noiseless presentation of 
the items to be attended to for an adjustable and 
measurable unit of time, and (3) the quick withdrawal 
of the items at the end of this period. The observer 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT: ATTENTION 61 

then records the number of items seen. These may 
be single letters, numbers, or arbitrary forms. Re- 
searches in this field indicate that the foreground of 
consciousness is restricted to a total of six or seven 
processes or groups of processes. Six or seven letters 
or such combinations of letters as combine to produce 
new units, or even six or seven combinations of words 
into sentences or stanzas of poetry, may occupy the 
focus of attention at any one time. The essential 
element is the unitary mental process, however num- 
erous the physical compounds may be. This maximal 
range of attention obtains, of course, only under stand- 
ard and favorable conditions. In hypnosis and hys- 
teria, although greatly magnified in clearness, the fore- 
ground is much more restricted in range. Conditions 
of fatigue and age also modify it. 

51. Stacks oe^ Attention. — So far we have been 
discussing attention as a general state of consciousness 
in which processes are arranged in a pattern of clear- 
ness and obscurity. We have still to sketch the 
development in the course of time of any particular 
group of processes from a state of relative obscurity 
to that of high attentive clearness. Figuratively speak- 
ing, mental processes are continually changing, some- 
times exchanging, places in the scheme of clearness 
values. The different ways in which processes are 
brought to the foreground and in which they retain 
their place in the foreground is usually discussed under 
the heading of the developmental stages of attention. 

The first stage or primary attention, is probably 
primitive and largely instinctive. An object (1) that 
gives intense stimulation to one or more of the senses, 
like a bright light or a loud sound, or (2) one that 
appears suddenly, or (3) an object that is moving, or 



62 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

(4) something that has a peculiar quaUty, like odd reds 
and yellows, certain kinds of sound, odor or touch, or 

(5) an object that is novel, unexpected, and unfamil- 
iar, or (6) curiously enough, things which fit into the 
present trend of our associations and are therefore 
congruous with the experiences of the moment, — all 
of these objects easily compel attention. The sharp 
rap of the conductor's baton in an orchestral rehearsal, 
the peculiar sound of the aeroplane overhead, the 
strong flash of an automobile headlight, the movement 
of underbrush in an otherwise quiet forest, are in- 
stances of the arousal of primary attention. There are 
naturally many applications of one or more of these 
principles in advertising, of which the reader will be 
readily reminded. 

The second stage requires effort on the part of the 
individual because it presents a conflict between two 
or more sets of claimants for his attention. It is often 
referred to as the secondary stage and is found in the 
higher forms of animal life. Suppose that two different 
persons present food to a dog from^ different angles 
at the same time. One or the other, perhaps one after 
the other, will receive attention, but for a few moments 
there may be a conflict between the two situations. Or 
assume that it is a warm day and you have an impor- 
tant report to make, accounts to straighten out, or let- 
ters to write. Someone suggests an outing or a game 
of golf or the postman brings the lastest number of 
a popular magazine. A struggle may ensue in which 
one or the other possibility is strongly presented. 
Under such circumstances, while the alternative still 
presented itself attention to the processes involved in 
making out the report, arranging the accounts, or writ- 
ing the letter would be of the secondary type. 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT : ATTENTION 63 

If, however, the matter rested and you have become 
absorbed in the task which was at first irksome so that 
it is difficult to call you away from it, your attention 
has then lapsed into what may be called the tertiary 
stage. After the conflict and the effort, the object 
engrosses the attention without conflict or effort. 
Authors give different names to these stages where 
uniformity of designation is to be hoped for, but they 
are generally agreed in the number of stages and more 
or less agreed in their description. Concerning the 
rise and fall of attention, experiments indicate that it 
takes a process or group of processes from one to two 
seconds to attain maximal clearness; hence whenever 
the highest degree of attention is desired, preparatory 
signals are given, as in the starting of races, in the 
giving of orders, in the initiation of an experimental 
series, or in "bringing an audience to attention." 
Furthermore a single unmodified process cannot re- 
main maximally clear for more than a few seconds. 
Records on this point are not yet uniformly accurate, 
but it is very likely that the accounts of processes held 
for longer periods fail to report minor changes in the 
processes. 

52. The Function oi^ Attention. — We have al- 
ready stated that attention serves to bring mental order 
out of physical chaos. In selects experiences in order 
and organizes them. The highly trained specialist by 
repeated selection has attached attentive values to his 
various experiences, which tend to organize the ex- 
periences of like nature that are later to recur. Ear- 
training in music and eye-training in the sciences are 
not so much a matter of ear and eye as they are a mat- 
ter of attention, association, and meaning. With prac- 
tice an educated person has learned to analyze exper- 



64 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

iences and to set them into proper places. These 
places are furnished by association, a topic treated in 
the next chapter. Attention, then, functions as an an- 
alyzing operation, but it serves also to synthetize ex- 
perience by proper organization. We first pick ex- 
perience apart and then set it together again. The lat- 
ter procedure is completed by associative organization 
under attentive scrutiny. 

53. Summary. — This chapter has briefly described 
attention as the organizing function of the mind and 
as its condition of clearness and obscurity. Processes 
not only pass in review but they proceed with varying 
degrees of distinctness. Fundamentally obscure pro- 
cesses are sometimes said to belong to the ''subcon- 
scious'', but that was shown to be an unnecessary hy- 
pothesis. There may be several degrees of clearness at 
any one moment, but many individuals conform to the 
type of mind that reveals only a foreground and a 
background. Many processes like outside noises or 
pressures from our clothing may remain in the back- 
ground but they are seldom unconscious. Instruments 
have been devised for the study of various problems of 
attention, but especially to investigate the number of 
single items, or unitary groups of impression, that can 
be held maximally clear at any one moment. Six or 
seven such processes have been counted under exper- 
imental conditions and average situations. Three 
developmental stages are described as primary, sec- 
ondary, and tertiary. It is also found that a process 
cannot become maximally clear in less than from one 
to two seconds, and may not remain so for more than 
a few seconds. In general, attention serves to organ- 
ize experience through analysis and synthesis of pre- 
sented impressions. 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT : ATTENTION 65 

Rtvi^w Questions 

1. Compare mind to a pile of mail on the desk: how 

might attention then be illustrated? 

2. For what two reasons is it unnecessary to assume 

a suhconscioiisness? 

3. Can a mind ever be a blank? Can it be inattentive? 

4. Illustrate what is meant by a stage of attention; by 

the range of attention? 

5. Indicate five principles employed in advertising to 

gain attention. Are any of these also used in 
public speaking; in salesmanship? 



CHAPTER VII 

JVIENTAL ARRANGEMENT: ASSOCIATION 

54. Associative: Connections. — Perhaps no topic 
in psychology has occupied the attention of the class- 
ical psychologists more than the subject of associa- 
tion. Some recognized it as of the same importance 
as gravitation in the physical sciences; one called it 
a ''gentle force'' ; several built up a ''chemistry of the 
mind'' on the basis of it ; and almost all of them have 
tried their hand at formulating laws concerning it. 
Few writers in the historical development of psy- 
chology have regarded association from the mental as- 
pect, and consequently the laws of association have 
undergone much modification in recent decades. 

With some rather remarkable exceptions, early 
authorities confined association to the realm of ideas. 
In present practice, however, there is a strong ten- 
dency to regard any complex process as an instance 
of association : perceptions as well as ideas are as- 
sociated complexes. Truth is that every new ex- 
perience that enters consciousness becomes immedi- 
ately assimilated into the system of processes already 
in mind, forming associative bonds in turn with still 
other processes to come. From this point of view, 
then, mind becomes a tremendous network of as- 
sociative connections. Yet it is not simply a tangle 
of unrelated processes, but, in the normal mind, an 
orderly array; orderly to such an extent that, if all 
the conditions were known, it would be theoretically 
possible to predict the associative connections in any 
particular instance. To the psychologist it is not sur- 
prising, for example, that two intimate friends under 



MENTAI. ARRANGEMENT: ASSOCIATION 67 

the same conditions should think of the same things 
at the same time. 

It is this organization of consciousness from moment 
to moment, the development of complex processes, 
that is discussed under the heading of association. 
Some items of experience are grouped together when 
presented for the first time as the fusion of tones in 
the clang, or the blending of tastes and smells, or any- 
other qualitative perception, and some temporarily 
successive impressions like members of a rhythm or 
melody are forthwith synthetized into groups. These 
are not clear cases of association. But when the 
taste-blend suggests or means ''coffee'', or when the 
melody calls up the accompanying words, we have a 
clear case of an associated process. In this instance 
the set of impressions that enter consciousness find 
waiting for them the representatives of some previous 
experience which at once attach themselves to the new 
process or group of ^processes. This matter was al- 
luded to in the discussion of perceptions and meaning: 
perceptions acquire im.agery, images become associated 
with other images, ideas with other ideas, and thoughts 
with other thoughts. The tendencies for some of 
these associations seem in many cases to be present 
at birth, ready to manifest themselves at the proper 
period of development, like the complexes of emotions, 
instinctive reactions, and accompanying ideas; others 
are acquired by training and education. 

55. Thi: Law of Association. — The attempts to 
formulate general statements concerning association 
clearly reveal the errors into which previous thinkers 
fell. These statements refer to the objective con- 
ditions under which associations may take place; they 
assume that only ideas are associated ; they imply that 



68 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOI.OGY 

these ideas are identical with the objective conditions; 
and they presume that ideas are stable and unchange- 
able entities like stones in a wall or tiles in a floor. 
There are four classical laws that appear in the 
literature: we tend to associate things (1) that are 
similar, (2) that are in contrast to each other, (3) 
that occur at the same time, and (4) that occur at 
the same place. Most of the examples were couched 
in terms of the recall of familiar objects, although 
some writers cited instances from other mental pro- 
cesses besides memory. Some of these laws were 
gradually modified and reduced until with the modern 
point of view came a wholesale revision and trans- 
formation into a single law : if a mental process that 
has previously occurred in consciousness is reinstated, 
other processes that occurred with it on the former 
occasion tend also to reappear. There are further 
statements concerning the conditions of association, 
referred to sometimes as ''secondary laws,'' but they 
are more appropriately discussed in the next section. 

56. Memory. — While, according to our previous 
description, the topic of association embraces all 
mental processes of a complex nature in which simpler 
processes are incorporated, it is more frequently the 
practice to consider in this connection the higher com- 
plexes of ideas that function as memories, imagina- 
tions, anticipations, and thoughts, and the relation of 
the various complexes, like ideas, perception, emotions, 
actions, sentiments, and thoughts, to one another. 
Let us first consider memory. 

In the memorial consciousness there are always at 
least two factors to be considered: (1) consciousness 
consists almost entirely of ideational material and a 
feeling of familiarity, and (2) there is a distinct ref- 



MENTAI, ARRANGEMENT : ASSOCIATION 69 

erence to the individuars past. The ideas that occur 
tend consciously to Hnk the past with the present. 
This is especially true of all memory images. The 
memory after-image, like the sensory positive after- 
image, is a brief recurrence of the original effect 
shortly after its cessation, but not as much dependent 
on the characteristics of the original impression as is 
the sensory after-image. It lacks, however, the feel- 
ing of familiarity and the backward reference of the 
true memory image. 

Much of the work on memory Is concerned with an 
analysis of the conditions underlying effective learn- 
ing, retention, and reproduction; that is, (1) the 
factors which favor the period of impression, (2) 
those that make for adequate retention during the in- 
terval between learning and recall, and (3) those that 
influence the recall itself. But experimental work has 
been concerned for the most part with the first of the 
three sets of problems. In each case the factors might 
be assembled under the three heads of (a) physical 
conditions surrounding the individual who is learning, 
(b) physiological conditions of the organism, and (c) 
the psychological conditions In the mind of the learner. 
Under the first rubric we can Include the four condi- 
tions mentioned In the earlier laws together with such 
items as : visual vs. auditory method of presentation, 
imposition of a rhythmical emphasis on the members 
of a series to be learned, grouping of the members, 
learning by parts or by wholes, position of members 
In the series, length of the series, distributions of the 
learning period, recency and frequency of connection, 
the rate of presentation, length of Interval be- 
tween learning and recall, amount and nature of dis- 
tracting stimuli, and the methods of eliciting the re- 



70 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

sponse. Under the second rubric come such considera- 
tions as the degree of vigor or fatigue, the age of the 
individual, the period of the day during which the 
work is done, and the presence or absence of other 
physiological disturbances. The last or psychological 
conditions involve the degree of attention on the part 
of the individual, the amount of accompanying in- 
terest or feeling, the intention to remember, the 
amount of actual mental preparation in the field of the 
subject to be memorized and recalled, and the habitual 
attitude toward one's memorial abilities. 

The results that have been obtained in connection 
with these questions and many others since the class- 
ical experiments of Ebbinghaus in 1885, are indeed 
too numerous and detailed to be given here. Among 
them may be mentioned, however, the effects that they 
have had on our educational practices in the school- 
room and on some of the devices that are advertised 
in our popular literature. While there are every- 
where qualifications to be made, it is certain that, for 
instance, advantages lie in the following suggestions: 
it is best to have the material presented both visually 
and auditorily, with some recurrent accent or rhythm ; 
while the material to be memorized ought to be learned 
as a whole, it is best to divide the task if the entire 
amount is too great to be kept as a whole ; distribution 
of the repetitions of a series to be learned has a de- 
cided advantage over the method of learning the series 
with the same number of repetitions during a single 
period, because as James stated in the example of 
learning to skate in summer and to swim in winter, 
progress seems to be made physiologically during In- 
tervals that are not occupied with active learning 
(Jost's law) ; slight distraction under certain condi- 



MENTAI. ARRANGEMENT: ASSOCIATION 71 

tions seems to favor learning mainly because of the in- 
crease in the active and attentive effort to learn; ac- 
companying emotion or feeling seems to increase the 
memorial effect, just as healthy, vigorous, and rested 
bodily conditions improve both the learning and the 
recall; and there are mxany recent experiments that 
prove the decidedly positive effect of mental attitude 
both by way of confidence in the ability to remember, 
and the self -instructed intention to recall v/hat has just 
been experienced. 

Much of this discussion is graphically represented 
in the ''learning curve'' which shows by the direction 
of a line the progress of learning. The vertical units 
are usually expressed as amount of work accomplished 
and the horizontal units are marked off as time inter- 
vals at which this amount is ascertained and re- 
corded. The line generally shows a marked rise or 
increase in the amount of work during the earlier 
periods and a gradual flattening as time proceeds, in- 
dicating only relatively small increments of work. 
There has been discussion of the occasional "dead 
lever' or ''plateau" when no gain is made but which 
is sometimes followed by large increments in succeed- 
ing periods. 

57. Improvement oe Memoey. — Until recently, 
authorities were divided regarding the possibility of 
improving memory in any specific case. Now it seems 
certain that there are physiological limits set in each 
individual, within which limits there is hope of im- 
provement, but beyond which lies little or none. 
These limits may be fairly wide in some cases and 
narrower in others. Those who have early realized 
their ability to remember have made further gains 
through practice and a store of self-confidence. 



72 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

Development usually follows along the lines Indicated 
in the above paragraph and with the development of 
interest in certain fields or subjects, i. e., with the in- 
crease in the number of possible associative connec- 
tions to be made. Sometimes it is restricted to certain 
kinds of material like names, faces, musical selections, 
phrases, or gestures. Most important is the degree of 
interest and attention given to the task and the specific 
instruction which accompanies the material, such as, ''I 
must remember that story," or ''That's a good quota- 
tion to fix in my memory." Certain it is now that 
quick remembering does not necessarily lead to quick 
forgetting. The memory methods on the market 
capitalize the above instructions and gain their results 
in the interest aroused, in the time, energy, and money 
spent, and in the mnenonic devices invented to fix and 
organize the isolated material presented. 

58. Imagination. — The scientific use of the term 
"imagination" Is restricted to a limited range of func- 
tions, but there Is no agreement as to Its exact Im- 
plications. We speak quite accurately of Imagination 
when we mean the use of Imagery without the back- 
ward reference of memory or the foreward reference 
of anticipation. We Imagine a scene In a book of 
travels that we are reading when we neither remember 
having been there nor anticipate going there. And yet, 
genetically considered, the Imagery used In this con- 
nection comes from various Items of our past experi- 
ence and may at times be accompanied by a desire to 
see the place. But there Is no necessary conscious ref- 
erence to one's past or future In an imagination as 
such. The designation, "reproductive imagination," 
suggests history rather than conscious relationship of 
the present process. In productive, creative, con- 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT: ASSOCIATION 73 

structive imagination we have terms that imply the 
usefulness of imagination as an aid for planning, in- 
venting, and thinking. Just as out of our past mental 
life we construct in reproductive imagination the 
scenes laid in the drama we are reading, so in writing 
a book of our own we may construct and invent scenes 
by creative imagination from the same source. In 
this second manner imagination is closely related to 
the thought processes. 

59. Anticipation. — Forecasting the probable events 
of tomorrow's trip to another city, we are again em- 
ploying imagery which arises out of our past but is 
not consciously recognized as such: its immediate re- 
ference is to the future. In a sense, too, it is creative. 
Briefly, then, the function of imagery, when directed 
to the individual's past, is memorial; when directed 
to the present, it is imaginational ; and when directed 
to the future, it is anticipatory. 

60. Recognition^- — When a perception is accom- 
panied by a feeling of familiarity we term the complex 
a recognition. It has a varying history. Recognition 
may take place immediately and completely. At once 
a sufficient number of details come to mind that place 
the person who confronts you. However, you may 
not be so successful; a half -recognition may take 
place immediately, but all you can say is that the face 
is familiar. Recognition then is incomplete. An in- 
complete recognition may be replaced by a complete 
recognition, though delayed, when some additional 
item like the sound of the voice clears up the whole 
situation. When recognition has taken place re- 
peatedly it emerges as nothing more than an ordinary 
perception. The silverware on our dining table, after 
years of familiarity, is simply perceived — until per- 



74 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

haps some burglar makes off with it. Then, if luck 
returns, the loot is discovered, and we are asked to 
identify it, familiarity again returns and recognition 
replaces the former unfamiliar perception. 

61. Types of Association. — We have outlined 
some of the more significant forms of association, 
but we have not forgotten that the topic properly in- 
cludes all types of combined processes. Most im- 
portant of these are perceptions and ideas; together 
they illustrate the type of association known as as- 
similative. When I look out upon my garden and 
point out features of it to my neighbor, we both think 
we are seeing the same things. Our eyes are seeing 
alike, but our minds are perceiving differently. The 
tree I am indicating with my finger is perceived by me 
as the tree that once grew in the woods near a sum- 
mer resort; he may perceive it as a Norway maple 
listed in some nursery catalog. Our previous experi- 
ences have influenced our present perceptions ; and so 
all of our perceptions are every moment entering 
minds ditterently furnished : they become assimilated 
to the processes already there and are colored by them. 
A senatorial investigating committee can never see the 
miner's life as the miner sees it ; a friend sees in a po- 
litical candidate's remark an expression of the highest 
altruism while his opponent cannot see anything but 
egotism in it; and a typographical error is repeatedly 
passed over while a word correctly spelled appears 
wrong. The same of course is irue of our ideas. One 
person simply cannot conceive of internationalism as 
anything but a powerful alliance of aggression; an- 
other conceives it as the most peaceful affiliation of 
peoples that the world has seen. Ideas of home, war, 
right, duty, and love differ in like manner from in- 



MENTAL ARRANGEMENT : ASSOCIATION 75 

dividual to individual. But throughout, the type of 
association indicated shows a tendency to incorporate 
the representative elements of a previous experience 
with the processes at present in the focus of conscious- 
ness. 

But this type may lead to still another, though re- 
lated one. Suggest to a group the word holiday and 
immediately a host of ideas will flood the conscious- 
nesses of the auditors : ''no work,'' ''picnic," "fishing,'' 
"reading," "loafing," "dance," and many others may 
crowd consciousness in a flash. This is called simul- 
taneous association, and seems to be by far the most 
frequent. One idea will set oif a multitude of other 
ideas as a bomb ignites many shells at once in a powder 
dump. 

The other type of association was the one most often 
discussed by the older writers but is now thought to 
be of less frequent occurrence. It is the successive 
type. One group of ideas leads oif into another group 
which in turn suggests a third, and so on. Each group, 
however, has elements in common with the next. A 
letter from a friend suggests a social event on a 
previous visit ; that suggests another person whom you 
met on the occasion, which brings vividly to mind 
the fascinating conversation, then the chief topic of 
the conversation, relatives in France; then comes to 
mind the fact that 3^our brother ought to be on the 
v/ay back, which suggests the party you had thought 
of having in his honor, which in turn arouses the idea 
of writing to a certain friend about the affair, which 
then makes you think that you had better wait until 
you hear from her again, and so on. Reveries are oc- 
casions for tracing out so-called "trains of thought" 
which are nothing more than a series of associated 
ideas of this successive type. 



76 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

62. Methods of Investigation. — The market 
furnishes a great variety of apparatus which is used 
experimentally for investigating associations. Most 
of the instruments are designed for the purpose of 
carefully presenting members of a series to be learned 
under controlled conditions. The methods of invest- 
igation fall in two large classes : ( 1 ) those examining 
new associations and (2) those examining old associa- 
tions. The first group of methods analyze associa- 
tions while they are in process of formation; the 
second inquire into associative connections that have 
already been formed. Because it is necessary to be- 
gin with material that has as far as possible no as- 
sociative meaning and the further desirable feature 
of being made up of members that are of uniformly 
equal weight in the series, so-called ''nonsense syll- 
ables'' have been devised. They consist usually of two 
consonants separated by a vowel and are monosyllabic : 
NUS^ I.OD, ziR, ^KSNy SOQ, are examples. The 
second group of methods is divided into the continued 
type in v/hich a word is given by the experimenter and 
the observer is told to give as many as a hundred 
words in reply ; and the paired type, or the method of 
''paired associates/' in which a single response is 
paired off with each stimulus-word. Both of these 
types, and especially the latter, may be used as a ''con- 
trolled association" with an instruction to restrict the 
response to those words that are related to the given 
or stimulus-word as coordinate, subordinate, or super- 
ordinate, as similar or opposite, as rhymed, as genus 
to species or the reverse, and so on ; or both types 
may given as a "free" association method without such 
restriction. 



MENTAI. ARRANGEMENT : ASSOCIATION ^7 

63. The Diagnostic Association. — Use has been 
made of the association methods in order to diagnose 
a concealed situation. It was hoped at the outset to 
apply the method to criminals appearing before the 
courts, and some trials of it have thus been made, but 
the results probably came from the effects of a re- 
fined ''third degree" in which the accused finally con- 
fessed rather than permit the psychologist to receive 
the credit. In the laboratory it has usually had good 
success even with sophisticated observers. In this 
form the following arrangements are generally made : 
each one of a series of observers is given the choice 
of doing one of two or more tasks, like the opening 
of one of several boxes, the following of one of several 
instructions, the entering of one of several rooms. In 
the meantime the experimenter has drawn up a list 
of single words some of which refer to the one set of 
conditions, some to the alternative, and some to com- 
monplace situations; these sets of words are given 
in haphazard order with instructions to reply with the 
first word that comes to mind after each word in turn 
is called out; the word and the speed of reply as given 
by a stop-watch are recorded; and the experimenter, 
judging from the character of the response- word, the 
delays in significant responses or in insignificant ones 
that immediately follow, but without first-hand knowl- 
edge, determines what task the observer had elected 
to do. The observers are frequently not told to con- 
ceal the information, but naturally assume that they 
are to do so. 

64. Summary. — We have seen how the problem 
of association attacks the very fibre of mental life, 
solving the question of the arrangement from moment 
to moment. The traditional laws are therefore super- 



78 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOI^OGY 

ceded by a more general law. One of the associated 
groups, memory, revealed a host of problems and re- 
sults, and improvement of memory lay chiefly along 
the line of these results rather than in any inherent 
change of the function. As memory implies the back- 
ward reference of imagery, so imagination implies re- 
ference to the present, and anticipation to the future. 
Recognition is much like memory save that its es- 
sential mental process is a perception rather than an 
idea. Three types of association were discussed and 
illustrated and the methods of investigation classified 
under two heads with several subheadings. Finally 
we reviewed, under the name of the diagnostic as- 
sociation, the application of one of the methods to- 
ward the analysis of concealed situations. 



RE^VIE:w QUE^STIONS 

1. Show how ''Niagara Falls" may at times be a 

memory, an imagination, an anticipation, or a re- 
cognition. 

2. Mention four physical factors which influence 

learning and apply them to any specific content to 
be remembered. 

3. Of what force in this connection is the ''instruc- 

tion" to recall? 

4. lo what extent may memory be improved? 

5. On what assumption does the method of diagnostic 

association proceed? To what uses in business 
could it be put? 



CHAPTER VIII 

ACTION 

65. The: Exi:cutive: Function. — Consciousness 
organized to do, to act, to accomplish, is described as 
the actional consciousness.With this name we designate 
consciousness as executive in function: mind is not 
only cognizant of its environment through perception 
and idea, but it is equipped to alter and affect the en- 
vironment and the relations of the organism to that 
environment. The actional consciousness must be dis- 
tinguished, nevertheless, from motor adjustments of 
the organism. There are, in the first place, types of 
movement like reflexes that may not involve 
consciousness at all. In some of the lower forms 
these may function, as in the case of the ''wiping" 
movement of the frog, even when the brain is re- 
moved. At any rate, in human beings, conscious pro- 
cesses are not necessary components of reflex adjust- 
ments : the opening and closing of the pupil, re- 
spiratory, circulatory, and digestive mechanisms work 
very well without conscious attention. In the second 
place we may experience a typical action conscious- 
ness when a movement is not made but is inhibited. 
When at a flower show we are at times strongly 
tempted to touch an exquisite specimen and all but 
do it, consciousness is typically actional, and yet no ex- 
ternal movement results. For this reason some psy- 
chologists are differentiating action from movement 
by restricting the former to those adjustments that 
involve conscious processes. 

This entire field is naturally good camping ground 
for the behaviorists who look to the manifestations of 



80 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

movement as indices of mental life. Where outward 
signs of behavior fail to appear they hope to obtain 
clues from changes in the body, the secretions of 
glands, or any other physico-chemical phenomena. 
Their program lies almost entirely in the future, but 
in some directions, as in the methods and devices for 
recording minute muscular and glandular changes, 
they have made notable progress. It remains to be 
seen, nevertheless, whether their results will accrue 
to the benefit of the psychological sciences or more 
directly to the advantage of the biological disciplines. 

66. Type:s oi^ Move)me:nt. — It is a moot question 
whether our complex actions have been built up out 
of the unconscious reflexes or whether the latter are 
vestiges of the former. A corollary of the latter posi- 
tion ascribes intelligence to the lowest animal forms 
because the earlier simple actions would then be con- 
sidered voluntary. The view that actions may de- 
velop in both directions, toward higher complication 
and also toward greater simplification, is now gaining 
wider acceptance. An act, then, involving a simple 
conscious motive may proceed toward increasing 
habituation or toward more involved voluntary action. 
The series is a gradual one but probably reversible in 
its genetic history. 

First of all, in the lowest form of animal life, there 
are the tropisms or tendencies to turn toward or away 
from light, heat, the earth, or various gradients of 
chemical stimuli. 

Then there are the spontaneous movements that are 
due to an overflow of energy. The most elementary 
organized movement is occasioned by the simple re- 
flex, a response, like the eye-wink, reduced to a simple 
muscular contraction due to the passage of energy 



ACTION 81 

from a definite stimulus over the shortest route of 
established nervous connection. More developed is 
the conditioned reflex in which the original stimulus 
has by training been replaced by another that has ac- 
companied the first. The oft-mentioned dog, whose 
saliva flows at first with the sight of food, but which 
later develops the saliva-reflex in connection with the 
sound of a bell that repeatedly accompanies the 
original stimulus, is an example. The vital, organic, 
ox automatic reflexes ^vt processes which involve some- 
times more than one stimulus and always a complex 
set of reactions, like the respiratory, circulatory, and 
digestive functions. The secondary reflexes are those 
highly automatized reactions that have been acquired 
during life but have become ''second nature," like the 
balancing movements of a rope-walker, also the move- 
ments involved in combing one's hair, tieing shoe- 
laces, and similar performances. They are the auto- 
matized habits, sometimes also called sensorimotor or 
ideomotor actions. The instinctive reactions require a 
much more attentive conscious accompaniment and in 
many of them there is even evidence of emotional con- 
comitants, but the greater part of the organization of 
movement is due to nervous connections already made 
or in process of formation at birth. Examples of in- 
stinctive actions are nest-building, hunting, collecting, 
mating, and movements that accompany many emo- 
tions. Instinctive performances are usually quite com- 
plex as regards the muscular coordination involved 
but the entire mechanism is started by a very specific 
set of stimuli. The simple impulsive action is a move- 
ment made with a conscious end in view and set off 
by a simple situation. The motive, whether due to 
"self-instruction" or to a suggestion or command from 



82 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

someone else, is realized and foreseen, but the starting 
point does not present any immediate difficulty or 
ambiguity. Beginning a race at the crack of a pistol, 
coming to a halt at command, giving someone a ''lift" 
with a trunk, are some of many examples. From this 
point on, actions become more and more complex as 
regards the initiation, the motive, and the resultant 
course of action. There may be a choice of starting 
signals, the voice of one whom you know as over 
against a score of other voices issuing commands ; the 
motives may be conflicting : ''to be, or not to be : that 
is the question"; and the resultant movements may 
be a complex series extending over some time, as in 
preparations for a journey. 

Some authors make a distinction between voluntary 
action, which implies a conscious motivation, and in- 
voluntary action, in which the movement is either 
automatized or physiological in its course. Some re- 
cent studies have indicated that some of the vital re- 
flexes which are usually beyond the direct control of 
voluntary effort, like the heart-beat, can nevertheless 
be consciously influenced. The author has also seen 
individuals who could expand and contract the pupils 
of their eyes. 

67. Habit Formation and the IvEarning Curve. 
— While we have already discussed the chief charac- 
teristics of the learning curve as developed in con- 
nection with association, there is also a legitimate 
place for its consideration at this point. Statements 
concerning its form and its interpretation made in the 
earlier section apply equally here. Typical curves 
have been drawn up in depicting the acquisition of 
various skilled movements, such as learning to type- 
write, to telegraph, to toss several balls at once in the 



ACTION 83 

air, and to wend one's way through a maze with a 
pencil. Similar curves depict learning in the lower 
forms of animal life. Thus we may trace the develop- 
ment of habituated action, always remembering, how- 
ever, that a habit is an automatized performance — 
which means that, while attention is directed on the 
movements involved in the earlier stages, the com- 
pletely formed habit is relatively unclear in the back- 
ground of consciousness, and requires little attention. 
The motive, of course, has also lapsed. 

68. The "Personai, Equation'' and the Reaction 
Time. — The historic rise and fall of the "personal equa- 
tion'' and the subsequent development of the reaction- 
time is a long story to tell. Suffice it to say that the 
question was first raised in astronomy toward the end 
of the 18th century when an assistant was dismissed at 
the Greenwich observatory, in England, for incom- 
petency because he had habitually recorded the transit 
of certain stars a fraction of a second later than the 
continental observers had recorded them. The manner 
of recording was, of course, quite crude but Involved 
a simple impulsive movement by what was known as 
the "eye and ear" method of stopping a clock as soon 
as the star was seen to cross a hair-line of the tele- 
scope. The dismissal gradually led to an inquiry into 
personal differences and to the measurement of the 
personal equation. The physiologists became interested 
because of the possibility of determining the speed of 
nerve conduction but they were soon quite discouraged 
when they frequently discovered that stimulation at 
one point of the body gave a longer reaction than 
at other points. Finally it was turned over to the 
psychologists because of the realization that some un- 
known mental factors had to be taken Into account. 



84 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

So the personal equation, or the time that expressed 
individual variations in executing a movement after 
a signal is given, was ushered into the psychological 
laboratories and it emerged as the ''reaction-time/' 
During the last quarter of the last century scores of 
experiments have attempted to analyze and to factor 
the reaction in all manner of ways. But it was not 
until Ach, in 1905, systematically presented an analysis 
of the actional consciousness that the work of these 
earlier years on reaction-times of choice, discrimina- 
tion and association were clearly interpreted. 

By dividing the entire duration of the action into 
three periods, — the fore-, mid-, and after-periods, — a 
careful introspective analysis was made possible. 
The fore-period reveals the presence of the ''instruc- 
tion'' and lasts from the time the ''instruction'' to 
act is given until the signal appears; the mid-period, 
the interval that is measured by precise instruments 
in thousandths of a second, covers the time from the 
appearance of the signal until the movement is made; 
and the after-period lasts for a time after the move- 
ment is completed. The outcome of these experi- 
ments shows that no one is able to execute a move- 
ment at the moment he hears a command or sees a 
signal : it always takes an appreciable fraction of a 
second to pull the trigger, to start on a race, or to dap 
one's hands after the perception of the sign to begin; 
but it also clearly demonstrates the fact that the 
differences in the reaction-times of various individuals 
are due solely to differences in the "instruction" that 
is given to, or habitually assumed by, the person who 
is reacting. If the "instruction" is of the "hair- 
trigger" type, to react as quickly as possible with the 
attention directed primarily to the muscles involved 



ACTION 85 

in the movement, then the time will be comparatively 
short and the reaction will conform to the muscular 
type. If the ''instruction'' emphasizes the quality of 
the perception which starts the reaction, then the time 
will be longer and the reaction will be described as 
sensory. In sensory reactions the observer pays at- 
tention to the kind of signal which precipitates the 
action and can be put on guard by introducing at 
times stimuli of different quality from the one agreed 
upon. The results are also slightly influenced by the 
sense departments appealed to by the signal. All 
time values are conventionally expressed in one-thou- 
sandths of a second, represented by the Greek letter 
sigma. The figures show that average mus- 
cular reactions to light are 180 sigma; to sound, 120 
sigma; to electrical cutaneous stimulation, 105 sigma; 
sensory reactions give for light, 290 sigma; for 
sounds, 225 sigma ^ and for electrical stimuli, 210 
sigma. Fatigue and practice, of course, will alter 
these figures somewhat. There is also a mixed type 
of reaction in which the agent fluctuates between the 
other two types in the direction of his attention, re- 
sulting in a reaction- time that is an average of the two 
extremes. 

69. The Actional Consciousness. — ^Analysis of 
action has revealed always a definite organization of 
processes that lead to the executive function. It is 
usually more complex at the end than at its inception, 
but throughout its course it seems to be guided by the 
motive. In actions that have degenerated into move- 
ments like the secondary reflexes, the motive has been 
replaced by a purely physiological organization. But 
in typical actions, the results of the action and the 
underlying motive are consciously foreseen. At the 



86 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

outset a perception or an idea appears to which the 
individual reacts by an expressed series of movements 
or by inhibited movements. Stepping forward to help 
a person who has slipped on the sidewalk is started by 
a perception; sitting down to vv^rite a letter may be 
started by an idea. In both instances there are na- 
turally accompanying ideas and in many cases feelings 
or even emotions of vividly colored consciousness, as 
is the case in ''excited'' or ''interested'' actions. The 
"instruction" may be carried by a mass of organic 
sensations or by a verbal phrase like, "I must do that 
now." 

70. The Will. — Like the term "soul" the word 
"will" has assumed something of an unscientific char- 
acter. Moral obligations and responsibilities are sug- 
gested with even religious implications. Volition is 
a more acceptable term. The "will" or volitional 
consciousness differs from the voluntary conscious- 
ness in that the command is not tacitly followed by 
the action but is consciously accepted and referred 
to the self of the reactor. An act that is "willed" al- 
ways reflects the individuality of the person. For 
a moment the person becomes self-conscious. In this 
manner he gives the act approval. The volitional act 
is frequently the outcome of a decision that has been 
verbally developed and is therefore complex. Often, 
too, it is accompanied by thought processes or at least 
by groups of ideas. This is particularly true of a 
deliberated act to which a final decision is attached. 

71. Summary. — Action manifests the executive 
function of consciousness and is developed in various 
directions. It is to be distinguished from movement 
which does not imply conscious intervention. From 
the lowest tropism, through the various forms of re- 



ACTION 87 

flex movement, to instinct, to simple impulsive action, 
and to volitional action, is a gradual series with an 
increasing attentive conciousness and awareness of 
purpose and result manifesting themselves. Much of 
scientific treatment of these phenomena has come in- 
directly from the astronomical L-d physiological ''per- 
sonal equation'' whose discussion finally led to a study 
of the reaction-time in the early days of the psy- 
chological laboratory. Then the beginning of the twen- 
tieth century afforded an analysis of the actional 
consciousness and the importance of the ''instruction". 
Latterly also much work has been done in depicting 
the development of skilled or habituated practices on 
the part of the lower animals as well as of man. 



Re^vie^w Qu:^stions 

1. Trace six different kinds of movement in the 

course of a morning's work. 

2. What does the learning curve indicate? 

3. What criticisms can you pass on such expressions 

as the "power'', the "faculty", or the "force" of 
the will? 

4. In what sense does mind exercise a "function"? 

5. Give a brief historical interpretation of the "per- 

sonal equation". 



CHAPTER IX 

THOUGHT 

72. The Deliberative Function. — We cannot 
leave the subject of human psychology v/ithout a dis- 
cussion of the highest mental function that the human 
species presents. As far as the evidence goes it does 
not at present seem possible that any of the lower 
animals can think in the accepted meaning of the 
term. But man can clearly apprehend his environ- 
ment in terms of perceptions and the ideas which re- 
present these perceptions; he can exert his influence 
in adjusting himself to the world thus apprehended 
by making suitable movements^ — and frequently un- 
suitable ones — but he may also solve, in advance of 
their application, the problems that the world pre- 
sents. In other words, he sometimes provides against 
future contingencies that may arise. 

We have already referred to thought in the discus- 
sion of creative imagination. But thought processes 
differ in several respects from the ideas of creative 
imagination. In creative imagination we begin with 
a general situation whose requirements are to be met, 
represented at the outset by a group of abstract ideas ; 
we end usually with a product that is concrete, a 
melody which we have composed, a plot that we have 
outlined, a device that we have invented. In thought 
we start with a very definite situation which is never- 
theless perplexing and from it we abstract a conclusion 
expressed in general terms. Another difference lies 
in the fact that thought depends upon the meanings 
symbolically represented in ideas, especially in verbal 
ideas. Many of the ideas may function vicariously 



THOUGHT 89 

as related processes. It is of frequent occurrence that 
a nod of the head, a wink of the eye, or a set of 
the mouth will not only convey a vast fund of in- 
formation to the observer, but the consciousness of 
these movements may be packed with meaning to the 
individual who is exhibiting them. So also may the 
visual image of a hazy, dark-brown spot mean ''sick- 
ness-doctor-medicine'' ; the picture of a view down a 
long straight passage may mean ''infinity" ; and death 
may be represented by a curved rod slightly draped 
at one end. It is almost always possible to trace the 
history of these symbols because they prove to be re- 
duced relics of more detailed pictures. The dark- 
brown spot may be the imaginal remnant of some ex- 
perience with a dark medicine; perhaps the paralled 
lines of the long corridor were sometime suggested 
by the statement concerning the meeting of such lines 
at infinity; and the curved rod doubtless is all that is 
left of the idea of death, the reaper with sickle in hand. 
There is much of this sort of thing in the thought 
consciousness, and frequently the ideas and images 
used in the development of the thought process are 
even more scrappy and far-fetched. The important 
fact is that thought utilizes such abstracted materials 
as the vehicles of meaning. 

7Z. The Thought Consciousness. — Aside from 
a small school of psychologists who believe that 
thought is as elementary an experience as sensation 
and those who write of "imageless" thought, most 
writers consider thought to be the most complex 
mental process of all. It was the last to resist 
analysis. It is composed of images, usually in their 
complex form as verbal ideas, but also of visual, 
auditory, and kinsesthetic types, all of them quite ab- 



90 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

breviated. They are organized in their course by an 
''instruction'' to solve a problem, and they proceed 
under a high degree of secondary attention. It is sup- 
posed by some authorities that a problem of this type 
may ''incubate'' for a time in the nervous system and 
be resolved on a future occasion. Some experimenters 
have also found evidence of a new process, called a 
conscious attitude or a mental attitude, in which a 
more protracted meaning is found to be telescoped 
and condensed. The observers reported attitudes of 
helplessness, complexity, doubt, effort, conviction, 
hesitation, and the like. For the time being these 
seemed to be incapable of analysis, but there is some 
indication that introspective scrutiny had not been car- 
ried far enough. The same criticism is applied against 
the assumption that thought belongs to a fourth class 
of elementary mental processes. 

74. Language. — This is not the place to treat the 
subject of language as such. We are chiefly interested 
in it as an expression and vehicle of thought. It must 
be remarked, however, that it is again an illustration 
of the symbolic use of sound and form. In language 
we do not give heed to the position, shape, arrange- 
ment of the strokes that constitute the letter or the 
word, nor intrinsically to the sound of them, but to 
the interpretation to which they give rise. The 
language of stamps and flowers illustrate this point 
very well. On this account, perhaps, after we have 
mastered the details of spelling, we later get to be 
poor spellers: the meaning is uppermost, the formal 
content secondary. Thought utilizes language and re- 
moves the meaning one step farther: the meanings 
of words may now be represented by grotesque figures 
or fragmentary outlines of word as we have before^ 



THOUGHT 91 

noted. So thought works hand in hand with language : 
the more highly developed and refined the expression, 
the more complex become the deliberative functions 
of thought processes. The genetic study of language 
demonstrates, especially in the child, the interdepen- 
dence of thought and language at each step. 

75. The Concept or Abstract Idea. — Two dif- 
ferent phases of the concept or abstract idea have 
been delineated : the one is made up principally of re- 
produced elements but now in fragmentary form, 
sometimes called representative; the other is con- 
structed on the basis of systematic thinking, referred 
to as typical. An illustration of the first would be 
the concept of ''tree'' made up as it commonly is of 
remnants of experimental factors : trees we have seen, 
or one of the trees is taken as a sample for the lot. 
The outline may be hazy, the background dim or gray, 
few particulars may remain; or on the other hand a 
fairly definite tree, a certain elm or maple, may 
stand as an instance of the class. In the typical con- 
cept, however, like that of force, mind, immortality, 
duty, and the like, we have either the word as a verbal 
idea, or some bizarre imagery whose history may be 
explained, like that described in the opening par- 
agraph, but which has come to stand for the meaning 
that is itself the fruit of thought. In both cases when 
generalization takes place, repeated features of suc- 
cessive instances that go to form the concept become 
schematized into some symbol which may also be 
verbal. 

76, Reasoning. — We may define reasoning as 
the function of mind which organizes experience. 
It differs from the organization which we discussed 
under attention and association in that it is the 



92 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

conscious attempt at such organization directed to- 
ward the problems and objects of the environment, 
while the attentive and associative organization refers 
only to the order and arrangement of the mental pro- 
cesses and procedures themselves. Thinking is the 
more general term covering all forms of problem- 
solving in terms of ideational processes, sometimes 
accompanied by physiological tendencies. Reasoning 
is usually restricted to the more formal, step-wise 
process of meeting a puzzling situation. The stages 
of this procedure may be grouped into four. At the 
outset comes an interruption in the smooth course of 
events presenting a hindrance or difficulty in the ad- 
justment of the individual to his environment. Then 
there is an apprehension, a scrutiny, and an analysis 
of the situation frequently involving a judgment of 
it. After that we find ourselves consciously referring 
to instances of previous experience, gathering data, 
comparing and relating facts and hypotheses, and ar- 
riving then at a tentative conclusion. The last stage 
consists of observing our conclusion at work and of 
modifying it to suit the circumstances that mav 
develop. /^ 5ff 

77. Judgment. — When a verdict is given to some 
problematic situation we have a judgment of it. The 
judgment may be an attributive phrase, ''That is a 
good shot"; it may be a movement or gesture, like 
the look or nod of approval or ''thumbs down"; or 
it may be entirely ideational, like the satisfaction with 
the commencement oration of a son. There always 
has been a tendency to find an outlet, as is evidenced 
by the uncomfortable feeling when refraining because 
of custom or regulation from giving applause at the 
end of a good organ selection splendidly played. 



THOUGHT 93 

There are also many gradations of judgment from 
the immediate attachment of a phrase or idea to an 
experience, all the way to a decision reached after 
days and even months of deliberation. In most cases 
such attachment, consciously made, terminates a 
thought-process. The attachment of a meaning to a 
perception can hardly be called a judgment because 
the reference is not consciously made: it simply ac- 
crues. In the entire treatment of the thought-pro- 
cesses, it is difficult to keep on the psychological side 
of the boundary line. The various sciences have be- 
come better neighbors and have removed their fences 
so the children may sometimes be found playing on 
other peoples' lawns. Logic, or the discussion of the 
formal process of thinking, thus has become some- 
what psychological; and the psychology of thought 
frequently overlaps logic. 

78. Summary. — Thought, the most complex func- 
tional process of mind, was found to be an attempt 
to discover a solution to problems of the environment 
that would not yield to the less complex processes of 
habituated consiousness. It normally consists of a 
series of processes, predominantly verbal, that are 
symbolically used and systematically arranged under 
the guidance of a latent "instruction" to find an 
answer. Sometimes the processes may drop out of 
clear attention and even give way to physiological pro- 
cesses. Occasionally observers have reported "image- 
less thoughts" and conscious attihides that by others 
have been declared unanalyzable. When thought be- 
comes definitely a matter of clear and sustained at- 
tention to the processes involved it is known as 
reasoning, of which four stages have been deter- 
mined. The study of language is important in. 



94 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

this connection because it furnishes an illustration of 
the symbolic use of signs and sounds, a symbolism 
carried even a step further in the thought function, 
and because the development of language has a strong 
reciprocal effect on the development of thought in the 
human mind. Two phases of the abstract idea or 
concept were also outlined, illustrated, and discussed. 



RirviKw Que:stions 

1. What mental process closely resembles thought? 

2. How are thought and language related? 

3. Introspectively analyze your mental processes while 

undertaking to solve a problem. 

4. Define reasoning, judgment, conscious attitude, 

5. What is meant by the symbolic meaning of imagery 

in thought? 



CHAPTER X 

THE SELF 

79. The Self. — The supreme organization of the 
individual mind leads at once to the self. There are 
two ways of considering this self. It is not im- 
possible to conceive of an orderly arrangement of pro- 
cesses all genetically related to one another in the 
same psychophysical organism. By development and 
assimilation all the perceptions, ideas, emotions, ac- 
tions, thought, and sentiments of an individual's men- 
tal life are more intimately related than are, for 
example, the ideas of one person with the ideas of 
another. At no time, of course, is an emotion, or 
an idea, or any other mental process entirely free 
from the remaining processes of mind in a single 
moment of consciousness; nor are the successive 
moments of consciousness free from each other. 
These are abstracted realities singled out under atten- 
tion for the purpose of examination, as a spot-light 
isolates a part of the scenery. This concept of the 
self resolves itself into the meaning of the term mind 
except that it stamps mind with an individuality that 
is lacking in general treatment. The self is a particular 
mind in this sense. In a second sense it is the con- 
sciousness of one's own experience that is meant, al- 
though the more frequently used expression in this 
connection is self-consciousness. Other uses of the 
term in psychology savor of metaphysical and epis- 
temological usage. The self can best be considered 
in the light oi an individual regarded as a progressively 
organised system of mental functions and processes. 

80. Personality. — It is difficult to define or even 



96 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

to describe a term that has so many social, moral, and 
religious implications ; but there is one point at which 
we are obliged to face the problem. We have seen 
how the self is organized in terms of the entire ar- 
rangement of functions and processes. In a later sec- 
tion we shall be prepared to consider types of mind 
that become disintegrated — split off into groups of 
processes. Since personality is largely the reflection 
of one's self in the social mirror, it is obvious that 
in the psychological sense the personality may alter 
slightly with the environment in which it finds itself. 
In Rome we do as the Romans do ; . everywhere we 
soon accommodate ourselves to our surroundings. 
Some individuals can make this accommodation more 
readily than others but we all do it to some extent. 
The writer has seen a group of college graduates of 
the class of 1855, at a commencement reunion, white- 
haired bankers, hard-headed business men, lawyers, 
and others, jubilantly acting like boys. They could 
hardly help doing so. All of us have different de- 
meanors on different occasions. From the mental 
point of view it means that we have complete systems 
of associations together Vv^ith the accompanying man- 
ners of behavior which fit various occasions and situa- 
tions. We do not consciously assume professional 
mannerisms at one time and put on the characteristic 
behavior of home life at another time. These are 
usually habitually determined by the setting, even by 
the clothes we wear. A policeman is much less of 
a policemen after a mob has deprived him of part of 
his uniform. The soldier assumes the air of a soldier 
when he dons his regimentals. We scarcely realize, 
indeed, how much of our customary frame of mind 
is derived from such sources as the environment 



THE SELF 97 

furnishes. Mark how mind is upset when unexpected 
reversals leave it deserted of public and friendly con- 
fidence! But in spite of these variations in the theme 
of any individual mind there persists, of course, a 
continuous mental texture. It is the same funda- 
mental composition throughout. Melodies may come 
and go, but the symphony of mind goes on to the 
end. In other words, while there may be groups and 
regroupings of mental processes, they are all related 
and integrated into one mind. This characteristic in- 
tegration in any one case we call the personality, or 
self. When we discuss the total assemblage of as- 
sociations on the side of process and function as con- 
sciously conceived, we refer to the self; when we re- 
gard this assemblage from the side if its reflection in 
environment and society, we term it the personality. 

81. Multiple or Altered Personality. — We 
have seen how circumstances tend to influence the 
set or connection of mental processes, calling out 
some that are characteristic of the occasion and in- 
hibiting others that conflict with it; and we have just 
remarked that there is nevertheless an undercurrent 
of continuous mental processes which unites all 
of these variations into one whole. After all, v/e 
can recall, under normal conditions, how we have 
behaved and misbehaved. But under stress of 
intense emotion and in a weakened mental condi- 
tion it sometimes happens that the self or personality 
thus differentiated by the circumstance or occasion 
remains cut off or isolated from the rest of the mental 
complexes. Memories become grouped about each 
separate central experience and characteristic manner- 
isms attach themselves to each set of complexes. 
Physicians and psychopathologists have reported many 



98 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

such cases in the scientific journals. One case that 
attracted pubUc attention about ten years ago de- 
veloped as many as five different personalities, most 
of them known by different given names, and some 
of them unconscious of the existence of the rest. One 
of the more prominent personalities represented a 
college girl of refinement and ability, the other a half- 
illiterate, almost vulgar, and mischievous girl who 
knew the weaknesses of the first and held them up 
for ridicule. The experiences of these different per- 
sonalities suffered no cross-reference but attached 
themselves independently to the appropriate subject. 
This topic, belonging primarily to other provinces of 
general psychology than the one being treated in this 
book, has been introduced by way of exception and 
emphasis to the general rule of the development of 
personality. 

82. Character. — Like personality the term char- 
acter partakes of social and ethical considerations. 
The distinguishing marks and traits that society as- 
signs to an individual in terms of his reactions to social 
conditions go to build up the character of the in- 
dividual. Some of these traits — many of them hab- 
ituated reactions, others inherent capacities, — are sub- 
ject to specially devised tests. A summary of these 
tests in any individual case may under scientific con- 
ditions reveal in a serviceable manner the character- 
istics of the individual tested. But the attempt to 
delineate character through the analysis of hand- 
writing, contours of head and face, posture, gait and 
the like, is unscientific, crude, and illogical. Much 
of it harks back to outworn doctrines. The logic in- 
volves the process of referring the characteristic of 
the generalization back to specific items. It is pos- 



THE SELF 99 

sible, for instance, to determine the average weight 
of a child at five years of age, but it would be ri- 
diculous to say that every child weighing that much 
is five years old. 

83. Soul. — In the opening chapter it was indicated 
that at the present state of our knowledge it is not 
feasible to include this term in our psychological 
studies. With the word soul invariably come the con- 
notations of individual responsibility, moral obliga- 
tion, immortality, and similar considerations that are 
germane to the religious and philosophical studies and 
not amenable to scientific research. They are matters 
of value and not of fact. Mind ceases, according to 
our hypothesis, at death: beyond that Vv^e have no 
scientific method of approach. But most of us, how- 
ever, still find solace in the religious disciplines be- 
cause we believe that no one study can give a com- 
plete answer to the insistent problems of the universe. 
Soul must therefore in this study never be confused 
with mind. 

84. Psychic Research. — There is at present a 
considerable amount of discussion, especially in Eng- 
land and France, but lately also in this country, con- 
cerning the ability to communicate with individuals 
after death and with living ones through media 
that are not at present recognized by science. 
Societies have existed in this country and abroad, for 
several decades, for the purpose of studying these 
and kindred phenomena under the name of psychic 
research; but although large sums of money have been 
offered for scientific demonstration of these occur- 
rences, no proof has been forthcoming. We cannot say, 
of course, that at this time we have the last word in 
print concerning everything that is to be known: the 



100 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

account with truth is by no means closed and 
there is no indication that it will be closed in the im- 
mediate future. But science cannot give assent to any 
statement of alleged fact that will not stand the tests 
upon which science is itself founded. So we av/ait 
proof. 

85. Self-consciousness.— After disposing of these 
matters we come back to that examination of the self 
which is represented in consciousness. Concerning 
the question as to whether we are persistently or only 
intermittently conscious of ourselves there seem to 
be two conflicting answers : some psychologists say, 
''yes, we are persistently self-conscious'', others say 
we are not. It is possible that those who speak af- 
firmatively are either themselves extremely self-con- 
cious or they confuse the philosophical implication of 
an ever present subject with the psychological fact of 
its existence in consciousness. It seems that the 
negative statement is nearer the truth of the matter; 
for on many occasions we are oblivious of our very 
existence, so thoroughly are we absorbed with the task 
in hand, v/ith not even a trace of the conscious self in 
the background of attention. 

The further question as to how, when we are con- 
scious of ourselves, is the meaning of the self given, 
may be answered by direct evidence from both in- 
trospection and pathological cases. Some individuals 
carry the meaning in terms of a complex idea em- 
bodying a visual picture of their appearance, perhaps 
a portrait, together with the sound of their own 
voices and the like. But the most important con- 
stituents of self-consciousness are (1) the persistent 
group of organic sensations from within the body 
combined with tactual pressures, warmths, and oc- 



i 



THE SELF 101 

casional pains, and (2) the continuous reference to 
one's past in terms of memorial and recognitive pro- 
cesses. In the abnormal cases it is frequently dis- 
covered that one or both of these contributing factors 
are responsible for alterations of personality or for 
total personal forgetfulness, technically known as 
amnesia. The individual either suffers some organic 
trouble which removes for the time being the impulses 
normally received from the vital organs of the ab- 
domen and chest as well as from the muscles and skin, 
or a nervous shock breaks down the connections in the 
brain, so that he begins again with a comparatively 
clean slate: there is no connection with his previous 
experiences, and he is therefore a new person. 

86. Summary. — We have seen in the last analysis 
the possibility of a vast system of relations between 
all mental processes. Insofar as this system is different 
in each individual we term it the self as distinguished 
from the mind which represents the general designa- 
tion for mental phenomena occurring between birth 
and death In any individual. The personality Is the 
reflection of this self In the social and environmental 
mirror and Is dependent on It, assuming different 
phases on different occasions. When these phases be- 
come so marked that they themselves become Isolated 
units of organization, we have the conditions of 
multiple or altered personality. Character was treated 
as the sum total of traits assigned to an individual by 
society and measurable by tests but not by the gross 
methods commonly advertised In the press. Soul Is 
disappearing from the serious writings of psychologists 
because of Its religious and philosophical Implications, 
and the attempts of psychic research to fathom the 
meaning of the unknown are not yet crowned with 



102 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

the success that science has a right to expect of ex- 
perimental procedures. In closing, we took the posi- 
tion that the the individual is not continuously con- 
scious of himself as distinct from his environment; 
that, when he is conscious of his own self, introspec- 
tion shows the factors to consist largely of a back- 
ground group of organic texture together with a re- 
ference to his own past experiences afforded by mem- 
orial and recognitive processes. 

The writer may be granted the parting statement 
that perhaps at this time, after a careful though neces- 
sarily brief analysis of complex mental processes and 
functions, the promise made in the opening sections 
of the book has been fulfilled. At least the reader 
possesses a clearer notion of the task of psychological 
investigation, its point of view, and Its results. With 
the description of mind now as complete as circum- 
stances will permit, the definitions tentatively offered 
at the beginning ought to be more clearly understood ; 
but they ought also to give way to the content that 
now stands of its own accord. They were but the 
scaffolding erected before the structure that represents 
our discussion, was completed. If the reader has 
taken a renewed Interest In the phenomena of the 
mind and Is able more to appreciate Its operation and 
constitution, If he becomes keenly alive to things 
mental In himself and In others, the purpose of this 
brief book has been accomplished. 



THE SELF 103 



RejviEw Questions 

1. Distinguish between self, self -consciousness, soul, 

personality, and character. 

2. Explain multiple personality in terms of the phen- 

omena of the normal mind. 

3. Enumerate three ways in which your attitude to- 

ward psychology may have changed as the result 
of reading this text. 

4. In what sense may the psychologist be legitimately 

interested in psychic research? 

5. In the light of your reading, how would you de- 

scribe the science of psychology to an inquiring 
friend ? 



APPENDIX A 
rHE INDUSTRIAL, APPLICATIONS OF PSYCHOLOGY 

Applied Psychology.— After a brief review of the rudi- 
ments of pS3^chology, it will doubtless be of interest to out- 
line the practical service which psychology can render 
mankind in his economic relationships and especially in 
commerce and industry. We have lately learned more 
emphatically than ever before the need of treating the human 
mind as though it were of some consequence in life. Out of 
the pure science of psychology, therefore, has grown up an 
extensive field of investigation and of accomplished results 
which might be designated "mental engineering." Applied 
psychology, its more usual name, has many branches that 
reach into the domains of legal practice and testimony, of 
medical treatment^ jf educational procedure, of social wel- 
fare, and even of artistic production. But probably the 
greatest endeavor at present lies in the direction of meeting 
industrial requirements and of improving business methods 
in general. 

For some time it has been the practice for men working 
in other sciences to consult the psychologist concerning prob- 
lems that had mental as well as physical aspects. But few 
people are aware that for some years prior to the Great War 
several large industries had psychologists on their pay roll 
and financially supported psychological research. One of 
the largest manufacturers of electric lamps and accessories 
regularly employed a psychologist, together with a physicist 
and a physiologist, to investigate problems of vision. A well 
equipped laboratory was provided for this purpose. 

The Consulting Psychologist. — But recently there have 
been more numerous calls for expert assistance in industries 
that began to realize the importance of taking mental factors 
into account. Manufacturers of high-grade tinted stationery 
saw the need of investigating problems of color discrimina- 
tion, partial color blindness, and color weakness. In other 
industrial establishments skilled movements have been care- 
fully analyzed by the moving-picture process with the purpose 
of selecting properly fitted individuals for the task or for the 
instruction of those who were to become skilled in the work. 
A group of professionally accredited psychologists have 



INDUSTRIAL, APPLICATIONS 105 

organized a private corporation to undertake contracts es- 
pecially for the mental examination and rating of the person- 
nel of industrial concerns. Just as a firm of auditors will 
make a financial investigation of a corporation, so these 
psychologists v^ill take a mental inventory of the industrial 
organization that requests it. 

Examination o^ Personne:Iv. — This particular field of 
investigation is now the forefront of applied psychology. 
It grew out of the needs of classifying the various occupa- 
tions in the army. There was a good start in this direction 
before the war, but the last five years helped considerably to 
set the young discipline firmly on its feet. The governmental 
bulletin, ''Personnel" is now being continued by the National 
Association of Employment Managers, and the entire method 
has been adapted to meet the civilian situation. 

The choice of vocations presents two large requirements. 
There must be established a thoroughgoing vocational selec- 
tion, or testing of candidates for any given trade or profes- 
sion, or portion thereof, in order to reduce the wasteful and 
discouraging effect of the "labor turnover", and to eliminate 
"misfits". The technical requirements of the work must be 
carefully analyzed and checked with adequately standardized 
tests and the candidates selected substantially on this basis. 
At intervals examinations are set to afford an opportunity 
for subsequent rating. This applies to the entire personnel, 
from executive to workman. A still more difficult problem 
is that of vocational guidance, which involves the knowledge 
of the important requirements of a great many different 
trades and professions and the guidance of the individual 
into the line of work for which he is best fitted. On account 
of the enormous scope of this problem relatively less has 
been so far accomplished; but the v/ork of testing men in a 
single profession in several instances compares very favor- 
ably with their actual success in the field. 

Generai, Eeeiciency. — Also, in a large industrial organiza- 
tion, or retail concern, there are problems of mental efficiency 
which constantly demand attention, research, and solution. 
The educational needs of industries that recruit individuals 
from all walks of life and all parts of the globe, with many 
diverging interests and widely different mental constitutions, 
require psychological advice. There are also problems of 
social service and adjustment among the various groups. The 



106 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

morale of business is o£ the same importance in time of peace 
as the morale of an army in time of war ; as the psychologists 
were needed in connection with the latter, so they are now 
demanded in connection with the former. Many of the avoid- 
able but frequently dangerous mistakes that occur in busi- 
ness also have a mental basis. 

SpECIai, ProbIvEms. — Finally we have to consider the special 
problems of buying, advertising, selling, and management. Of 
these perhaps advertising has invited the greatest attention 
on the part of our psychological laboratories. The general 
composition, position, size, frequency of appearance of ad- 
vertising matter and many other related phases of the subject 
have been experimentally investigated with success. Some 
of our universities located in the larger industrial centers are 
continually called upon to solve problems of this sort. The 
results of positive and negative suggestion in advertising and 
selling have been of great value as have also the experimental 
investigation of special phases of memory, attention, and 
sentiment. The field of selling and of buying presents mental 
problems which the psychologist is now endeavoring to solve. 
And the most difficult question is that of analyzing all the 
complex factors which make the successful executive and 
manager; but even here psychology has made a promising 
beginning. 

When it is realized that the entire staff of psychologists at 
one of our more prominent educational institutions of the 
country is devoting its entire time to the solution of mental 
problems in the industrial field, it can be understood why a 
brief discussion of the subject cannot here go into detail. But 
the references on the subject to fields of applied psychology, 
in the following biblography, beckon those who care to study 
the matter with care. 



APPENDIX B 

CLASSIFIED REFERENCES*) 
The Principles of Psychology 

1. Pii.i,SBURY, W. B. The Fundamentals of Psychology, 1916. 

Macmillan. Pp. 562. 

A large and systematic work with full references to 
experimental data. The author aims to tell more of the 
function of consciousness than of its composition or 
structure. 

2. TiTCHKNER, E. B. A Text-hook of Psychology, 1914 (last 

ed.) Macmillan. Pp. 565. 

The clearest and most complete description of mind 
from the structural point of view. The author has 
succeeded so well in citing and interpreting experimen- 
tal data in support of his position that the reader has 
no difficulty in comprehending the material. 

3. Angei.1., J. R. Psychology, 1908 (4th rev. ed.). Henry 

Holt. Pp. 468. 

A very readable account from a general biological 
point of view; a book of much influence especially in 
colleges and normal schools of the central west. 

4. Cai^kins, M. W. a First Book in Psychology, 1914 (4th 

rev. ed.) Macmillan. Pp. 428. 

The author consistently separates the structural from 
the functional aspect of mind and writes in a very 
fascinating style with many apt illustrations. The Ap- 
pendix contains carefully selected references. 

5. James^ W. The Principles of Psychology, 1890. (2 vols.) 

Henry Holt. Pp. 1393. 

A two-volume work, a classic in the American liter- 
ature of psychology. 



*) Note-. No reference to the periodical literature is made. The 
bibliography is necessarily incomplete in many respects, but the author 
will be glad to suggest further reading in any direction. None but 
specialized books are cited in the last three groups, because the topics 
are usually easily accessible as separate chapters in the general texts. 



108 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

6. Myers^ C. S. a Texf-book of Experimental Psychology 

(with laboratory exercises), 1911 (2nd ed.). Longmans, 
Green. Pp. 451. 

These volumes give the student a very good idea of 
English experimental psychology and at the same time 
some laboratory work of not too complicated character. 

7. Stout, G. S. A Manual of Psychology, 1915. (3rd rev. 

ed.) Hinds, Noble & Eldridge. Pp. 769. 

A detailed account from a leading English psychol- 
ogist of an older school. 

8. Seashore^ C. E. Elementary Experiments in Psychology, 

1909. Henry Holt. Pp. 218. 

A simple laboratory manual for which no apparatus 
is required. 

9. Warren, H. C. Human Psychology, 1919. Houghton, 

Mifflin. Pp. 460. 

The most recent presentation of the subject from the 
point of view of an organism struggling with its en- 
vironment. 

10. Watson, J. B. Psychology from the Standpoint of a 

Behaviorist, 1919. Lippincott. Pp. 429. 

A systematic study of the human mind by ^'objective" 
methods which aim to interpret the instinctive and ac- 
quired reactions. 
.11. WooDWORTH, R. S. Dynamic Psychology, 1918. Colum- 
bia University Press. Pp. 210. 

General Psychology 

12. Angei.1., J. R. Chapters from Modern Psychology, 1913. 

Longmans, Green. Pp. 308. 

13. Hunter, W. S. General Psychology, 1919. Univ. of 

Chicago. Pp. 347. 

14. MuENSTERBERG, H. Psychology, General and Applied, 

Appleton. Pp. 487. 

Physiological Psychology 

15. Ladd, G. T., & WooDwORTH, R. S. The Elements of 

Physiological Psychology, 1911. Scribners. Pp. 704. 

The most comprehensive work on the subject in 
America. 



CI.ASSIFIED REFERENCES 109 

16. DUNI.AP, K. An Outline of Psychobiology, 1917 (Znd ed.) 

Johns Hopkins. Pp. 145. 

17. McDouGAi.1., W. Physiological Psychology, 1905. Dent. 

Pp. 172. 

The simpliest account of the subject, and in small 
compass. 

18. Herrick, C. J. Introduction to Neurology, 1915. Saund- 

ers. Pp. 355. 

Animal Psychology 

19. Washburn, M. F. The Animal Mind, 1917 (2nd ed.) 

Macmillan. Pp. 386. 

20. Watson, J. B. Behavior, An Introduction to Comparative 

Psychology, 1914. Henry Holt. Pp. 439. 
The representative book on "Behaviorism." 

Educational Psychology 

21. ThorndikE, E. L. Educational Psychology (Briefer 

Course), 1915. Columbia Univ. Pp. 442. 

22. ThorndikE, E. L. Educational Psychology (3 vols.), 

1913. Columbia Univ. Pp. 1187. 

Probably the most thoroughgoing presentation of the 
subject. 

23. BAGI.EY, W. C. The Educative Process, 1915. Macmillan. 

Pp. 358. 
One of the most generally used books on the subject. 

24. Starch, D. Educational Psychology, 1919. Macmillan, 

Pp. 473. 

Child Psychology 

25. Waddle, C. W. An Introduction to Child Psychology. 

1918. Houghton, Mifflin. Pp. 317. 

26. KiRKPATRiCK, E. A. The Individual in the Making, 1911. 

1918. Houghton, Mifflin. Pp. 317. 

27. PrEyer, W. The Mind of the Child (trans.), (2 vols.), 

1890. Appleton. Pp. 663. 

Differential Psychology 

28. Whipple, G. M. Manual of Mental and Physical Tests 

(2 vols.), 1915. Warwick & York. Pp. 694. 



no BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

29. Terman^ L. M. The Measurement of Intelligence^ 1916. 

Houghton, Mifflin. Pp. 362. 

30. Thorndike, E. L. Mental and Social Measurements, 

1904. Science Press. Pp. 212. 

31. Franz, S. I. Handbook of Mental Examination Methods, 

1919. (2nd rev. ed.) Macmillan. Pp. 193. 

Vocational Psychology 

32. H01.UNG worth, H. L. Vocational Psychology, 1916. Ap- 

pleton. Pp. 308. 

33. Seashore, C. E. The Psychology of Musical Talents 

1919. Silver Burdett. Pp. 288. 

34. MuENSTERBERG, H. Psychology and Industrial Efficiency, 

1913. Houghton, Mifflin. Pp. 321. 

35. Scott, W. D. Increasing Human Efficiency in Business, 

1914. Macmillan. Pp. 339. 

36. Link, H. C. Employment Psychology, 1919. Macmillan. 

Pp. 440. 

Advertising and Selling 

Z7, Adams, H. F. Advertising and Its Mental Laws, 1916. 
Macmillan. Pp. 333. 

38. HoLUNGWORTH, H. ly. Advertising and Selling, 1913. 

Appleton. Pp. 314. 

39. Scott, W. D. The Psychology of Advertising, 1908. 

Small;^ Maynard. Pp. 269. 

40. Scott, W. D. The Theory and Practice of Advertising, 

1913. Small, Maynard. Pp. 240. 

41. Starch, L. Advertising, 1914. Scott, Foresman. Pp. 281. 

Social Psychology 

42. McDouGAi^L, W. An Introduction to Social Psychology, 
1914. John Luce. Pp. 431. 

43. WALI.AS, G. The Great Society, A Psychological An- 

alysis, 1917. Macmillan. Pp. 383. 

44. WuNDT, W. Elements of Folk Psychology (trans.), 1916. 

Macmillan. Pp. 532. 



CI.ASSIFIED REFERENCES 111 

45. Bai^dwin^ J. M. Social and Ethical Interpretation in 

Mental Development, 1906. Macmillan. Pp. 606. 

Psychology of Religion 

46. L^UBA, J. H. A Psychological Study of Religion, 1912. 

Macmillan. Pp. 371. 

47. Starbuck, E. D. The Psychology of Religion, 1903. 

Scribners. Pp. 423. 

48. Stratton, G. M. The Psychology of the Religious Life, 

1911. Allen. Pp. 376. 

Abnormal Psychology 

49. CoRiAT, I. H. Abnormal Psychology, 1910. Moffat, Yard. 

Pp. 325. 

50. Hart^ B. The Psychology of Insanity, 1914. Putnams. 

Pp. 176. 

51. Fox, C. D. The Psycho pathology of Hysteria, 1913. 

Badger. Pp. 437. 

52. Jastrow, J. The Siih conscious. 1906. Houghton, Mifflin. 

Pp. 549. 

Psychotherapeutics 

53. Mub:nstkrbkrg, H. Psychotherapy, 1909. Moffat, Yard. 

Pp. 401. 

54. SiDis, B. The Causation and Treatment of Psychopathic 

Diseases, 1916. Badger. Pp. 418. 

55. White:, W. A. & 'Jtiu.ttt, S. E. The Modern Treatment 

of Nervous and Mental Diseases, 1913. (2 vols.) 
Pp. 1683. 

History of Psychology 

56. KxKMM^ O. A History of Psychology (trans.) 1914. 

Scribners. Pp. 380. 

57. Dessoir, M. Outlines of the History of Psychology 

(trans.) 1912. Macmillan. Pp. 278. 

Attention 

58. Pii,i,SBURY, W. B. Attention, 1908. Macmillan. Pp. 346. 



112 BREVITY BOOK ON PSYCHOLOGY 

59. TiTCHENER, E. B. Lectures on the Elementary Psychology 

of Feeling and Attention, 1908. Macmillan. Pp. 404. 

Memory 

60. Meumann^ E. The Psychology of Learning (trans.) 

Appleton. Pp. 393. 

61. Watt, H. J. The Economy and Training of Memory, 

1919. Longmans, Green. Pp. 128. 

62. Ebbinghaus, H. Memory (trans.), 1913. Columbia 

Univ. Pp. 123. 

Thought 

63. TiTCHENER, E. B. The Experimental Psychology of the 

Thought Processes, 1909. Macmillan. Pp. 318. 

64. P11.1.SBURY, W. B. The Psychology of Reasoning, 1910. 

Appleton. Pp. 306, 

65. BiNET, A. The Psychology of Reasoning (trans.), 1899. 

Open Court. Pp. 191. 



INDEX 



113 



Abstract idea 91 
Action ^ ^ 79 
simple impulsive 81 
Actional consciousness 85 
Adaptation 25 
Advertising 10, 62, 106 
Affection 50 
After-image 24,45 
memory 45, 69 
of movement 38 
Amnesia 101 
Anticipation IZ 
Applied Psychology 104 
Association 66 
diagnostic 11 
laws of 67 
methods of inves- 
tigating 76 
types of 74 
Attention 24 
defined 58 
function of 63 
range of 60 
stages of 61 
Auditory sensation 13 
Automatograph 53 
Behavior 6, 79 
Bitter 21 
Blind-spot 17 
Body 7 
Character 98 
Clearness 24 
Cold 18 
Color-blindness 18 
mixture 17 
zones 18 
'Common' sense 19 
Concept 91 
Conscious attitude 90 
Consciousness 4 
Contrast 26 
Disposition 55 
Duration 24 
Emotion 53 
Ergograph 53 
Extensity 24 
Feeling 5r 
sense- feeling 5" 



Habit formation 82 

Halucination 45, 47 

Hue 16 

Idea 45 

abstract 91 

individual differences 

in 46 

Ideational type 46 

Illusion 38 

Image 42 

after- (see "after") 

hypnagogic 45 

quality of 44 

quantity of 23 

simple 42 

Imagination 12 

Instincts 54, 81 

"Instruction" 12, 84, 86, 90 

Intensity 23 

Interest 55 

Introspection 5, 6 

Josfs law 70 

Judgment 92 

Language 90 

Learning curve 71, 82 

Local sign 35 

Meaning 13, 29, 74, 89, 93 

Melody 36 

Memory 68 

after-image 45, 69 

improvement of 71 

Mental arrangement 57, 66 

Mental attitude 90 

Mental phenomena 3 

Method ^ 5, 52, 76 

of expression 52 

of impression 52 

Mind 3, 4, 7, 95 

Mixture 17, 25 

Mood 55 

Movement 6, 20, 79 

types of 80 

Noise IS 



Odor 
Pain^ 
Passion 



22 
18 

55 



114 



INDEX 



Perception 


30 


organic 


81 


of movement 


Z1 


secondary 


81 


qualitative 


31 


simple 


80 


spatial 


32 


Retrospection 


6 


stereoscopic 


ZZ 


Rhythm 


36 


stroboscopic 


37 


Salesmanship 


106 


temporal 


35 


Salt 


21 


Personal equation 


83 


Saturation 


16 


Personality 


95 


Self 


95 


altered or multip] 


ie 97 


Personnel 


105 


Self-consciousness 


100 


Plethysmograph 


52 


Sensation 


12 


Pneumograph 


52 


articular 


20 


Pressure 




auditory 


13 


cutaneous 


18 


gustatory 


21 


muscular 


20 


kinaesthetic 


19, 20 


Psychic research 


99 


number of 


13 


Psychological 




olfactory 


22 


laboratories 


2, 7 


organic 


19 


Psychology 




static 


20 


abnormal ^ 


9 


tactual 


18 


of advertising 10, 


62, 106 


tendinous 


20 


animal 


9 


visual 


15 


applied 


104 


Sentiment 


54 


of business 10, 


104-106 


Soul 


3, 99 


child 


9 


Sound localization 


32 


comparative 


9 


Sour 


21 


definition of 


^'^ 


Sphygmograph 


52 


differential 


9 


Stereoscope 


33 


educational 


9 


Stroboscope 


37 


ethnic 


9 


Subconsciousness 


59 


genetic 


9 


Synaesthesia 


45 


of individual differences 9 


Sweet 


21 


methods of 
physiological 
racial 
scope of 
social 


5, 52 
9 
9 
8 
9 


Tachistoscope 

Taste 

Temperament 


60 
21, 22 

55 


Thought 


89 


Psychopathology 


9 


imageiess 
Tint 
Tone 


89 

15 

13, 14 


Psychotherapeutics 
Reaction 


9 


mixed 


84 


Vocational guidance 


10, 105 


muscular 


84 


Vocational selection 


10, 105 


sensory 


84 


Volition 


86 


time of 


83 


Voluntary action 


86 


Reasoning 


91 


Vowels 


IS 


Recognition 


n 


Warmth 


18 


Reflex 




Weber's law 


23 


conditioned 


81 


Will 


86 



Deacidified using the Bookkeeper process. 
Neutralizing agent: Magnesium Oxide 
Treatment Date: Oct. 2004 

PreservationTechnologies 

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